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1.     Introduction 
 
The issue of labour supply in Sub-Saharan Africa, like so many other economic 
and social issues in the region, is often discussed as if the whole sub-continent faced 
essentially similar, overwhelming and intractable problems. This pessimistic and over-
generalised literature has been criticized elsewhere (Sender, 1999).  By contrast, this 
paper stresses the importance of differences between and within Sub-Saharan African 
economies in the quantity and quality of labour supplies, and highlights the scope for 
policies to overcome constraints on employment prospects. The paper also points to the 
dangers of one-size-fits-all policy recommendations for the labour market, while at the 
same time identifying certain similarities in the characteristics of the most disadvantaged 
labour market entrants in many Sub-Saharan African economies.  The aim is to begin to 
isolate the sub-set of policies that might be most relevant for these entrants, if donors and 
governments wish to re-allocate resources to improve prospects for the poorest Africans.1 
Not all relevant policies can be discussed. For example, countries "severely 
affected" by HIV/AIDS will need to adopt a different range of policies towards labour 
supply from countries with lower prevalence rates, but the details of preventive and 
curative policy options are not explored. The paper describes the complex effects of 
violence and violent conflicts on many aspects of labour supply, but does not discuss 
post-war reconstruction policy initiatives, or interventions to reduce conflict. And policies 
that influence the demand for labour will have dramatic dynamic effects on the quantity 
and quality of labour supplied but are largely ignored in this paper. Historically, when 
                                                 
*The authors would like to thank Deborah Johnston for substantive work on earlier drafts of this paper. The 
Centre for Development Policy Research at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of 
London provided administrative support and Ruchira Joshi helped in compiling the bibliography.  
 This paper was commissioned for the World Bank by Arvil van Adams, Senior Advisor for Social 
Protection – Africa Region, who has also given  helpful comments. The authors and the World Bank 
gratefully acknowledge the financial support given for this project by the German government.  The 
findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do 
not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represe 
1 The sample of countries analysed in most of the tables in this paper account for about 87 percent of the 
total estimated population of Sub-Saharan Africa.     
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demand for labour has been strong in Sub-Saharan Africa labour inputs have responded in 
a number of ways. Participation rates have increased; and labour migration has risen in 
response to demand for imported labour. It is also well-known that rising demand for 
labour generates improvements in the quality of the labour force, through learning-by-
doing processes and static and dynamic returns to scale. This paper is not concerned with 
the detailed analysis of appropriate macroeconomic strategies to achieve the level of 
demand required for rapid growth. The paper does, however, examine some of the 
barriers that workers in different countries currently face in responding to changing 
demand conditions in the labour market. These include transport and other barriers to 
labour mobility (Section 5); the structured disadvantage  experienced by women and 
certain other categories of worker (Section 2); the inadequacy of information, 
communication and money transmission facilities available to workers (Section 5); and 
government policies that are, to different degrees in different economies, limiting some 
workers’ access to the basic education, primary health care and the negotiating skills that 
are required for advantageous participation in labour markets (Sections 2-4).  
The paper also details the inadequacy of existing data and research on the poorest 
labour market entrants, particularly in a context of uneven and unreliably recorded 
HIV/AIDS prevalence. In addition to identifying some priorities for future research and 
the design of more relevant surveys, the paper concludes, on the basis of available 
evidence on the characteristics of these entrants, that too much emphasis has been placed 
on the issue of unemployment and on the existing and potential role of self-employment in 
the survival strategies of the poorest people. A new focus on the large number of poor 
women and men who participate in the labour market as workers for wages is required.  It 
is necessary to identify those sectors that, in the short- to medium term, are likely to 
provide them with the forms of wage employment that are crucial for their survival. 
Trends in the real wages of these unrecorded workers should be monitored to assess 
progress in poverty reduction. The paper also highlights some other important data and 
research gaps.  It is argued that more resources need to be devoted to understanding and 
recording the scale and patterns of labour force mobility within and between countries 
and from Africa to the rest of the  
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world and that, similarly, more resources should be committed to monitoring the 
scale, determinants and consequences of violence, especially violence against girls and 
women. 
There are several important barriers impeding the entry of the poor into forms of 
wage employment upon which they are most dependent.  Some of these barriers can be 
lowered by appropriate investments in transport, communications and money 
transmission facilities.  Others, including gender discrimination (see above) and the 
political and institutional factors reducing the bargaining power of both male and female 
wage workers, will only be overcome by less familiar policy initiatives, including 
legislation and investment to protect the workplace rights of "illegal" migrants and 
expenditures to improve workers' organisational capacity.  Less controversially, the paper 
argues for targeted interventions that focus on increasing both the supply of and effective 
demand for rural schooling. 
  The paper is organised as follows:  Section 2 focuses on the quantity of labour 
supplies. It begins by highlighting data inadequacies; it then proceeds to a discussion of 
the basic demographic trends that have influenced and will continue to influence the 
quantity (and quality) of the labour supply in different Sub-Saharan African countries, 
highlighting disparities between countries. Section 2 then discusses general patterns and 
inter-country variations in the labour supplies of prime age adults, children (including 
orphans), and youth. It examines these supplies in the context of the impact of 
HIV/AIDS, emphasising the difficulties involved in the projections of the labour market 
impact of the epidemic. 
Sections3 and 4 analyse the quality of labour supplies.2 Section 3 provides 
evidence on inter- and intra-country inequalities in the distribution of education, health 
and other services, in order to emphasise the fact that the labour supply from some 
regions and some households will have very different capacities to work productively.  
                                                 
2 This paper discusses labour productivity, health and education but does not use the concept of “human 
capital”, which is theoretically problematic and is typically used ahistorically (Fine, 1998: Ch.3 ). Nor does 
the paper cover the literature based on cross-country regressions purporting to account for the contribution 
of improvements in “human capital” to the growth rate or to the rate of poverty reduction or the similar 
literature estimating average social rates of return to investments in education (for critiques of which see 
Bennell, 1996; and Freeman and Lindauer, 1999; on the inadequacy of time-series data on income 
distribution and age-specific education stocks in developing countries and in Sub-Saharan Africa in 
particular, see OECD New Database Paper, 2002). 
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This section makes the case for policies that prioritise the bottom quintile of each 
country's rural population, which can be identified using robust and readily available asset 
or welfare indicators. However, it is also argued that designing appropriate, country-
specific policies will require improved survey data and methods, an argument that is 
taken further in Section 6. 
Section 4 identifies the potential for policy reform to improve the future quality of 
African labour supplies. The main influences on labour quality are the capacities to 
educate and to improve the health and skills of the next generation of workers. A robust 
analysis of these capacities, e.g., in schooling, is impeded by the paucity of country-
specific data. Obviously, HIV/AIDS affects the quality of future labour supplies, but this 
too is not immune to policy. This Section emphasises the need to shift expenditures and 
incentives in order to encourage tertiary education enrolment and more effective 
recruitment of teachers to work in poor rural areas. Other policy interventions may also 
help to improve the poorest children’s access to education, including payments to mothers 
conditional on their children’s school attendance, free school meals for poor children and 
orphans, abolishing requirements for uniforms, and eradicating user fees. Similarly, 
Section 4 highlights the case for redirecting donor and government spending to achieve a 
higher density of health workers, as well as reorienting health delivery systems so that 
they focus less on curative facilities in relatively well off areas and more on rural, 
preventative facilities staffed by community nurses and other auxiliary health workers 
(who are also less likely to emigrate than more professionally trained health workers). 
Section 4 also discusses technical, vocational education, training and skills programmes. 
It concludes, first, that there is no evidence that these have been an effective mechanism 
for enhancing basic labour market skills and, second, that their objectives may more 
effectively and progressively be met by investing in basic literacy and numeracy and by 
enhancing all workers’ capacities to negotiate with employers and to press for improved 
in-service training.  
Section 5 focuses on labour mobility, arguing that many forms of mobility are 
important to poverty reduction and that constraints on mobility restrict the growth of 
labour productivity and poverty eradication efforts.  It traces the main patterns of mobility 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, emphasising the vast scale and unevenness of mobility, the variety 
of factors affecting mobility and the inadequacy of the data. The roles of violence and 
direct and indirect forms of coercion in propelling population movements and creating 
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labour supplies are stressed. The section then examines the available data on flows of 
migrants from Africa to the rest of the world and to other African countries, before 
focusing on international flows of highly skilled labour, the remittances of these skilled 
workers and other implications of these flows.  A larger group of Sub-Saharan cross-
border migrants are then examined, namely: refugees, forced migrants and displaced 
people.  The Section continues with a brief discussion of the evidence on trafficking, 
followed by a more detailed analysis of the relationship between violence and labour 
supply. The policy implications, apart from the urgent need to invest in transport and 
communications infrastructure, are discussed in the final part of this Section.  They 
include the need to recognise and record more accurately migrant African labourers as a 
foundation for interventions to facilitate their mobility and to protect them from abusive 
relationships. 
Section 6 contains more detailed discussion of some of the policy implications of 
the earlier analysis. It starts by focusing on the importance of efforts to improve the data 
that should underpin all policy interventions, paying particular attention to the Living 
Standards Measurement Surveys funded by the World Bank. The emphasis throughout 
this paper is on the conditions affecting labour supply among those in the poorest quintile 
of the population. This Section argues that encouraging growth in sectors that are 
intensive in the use of unskilled (female) labour will determine whether or not many of 
the poorest labour market entrants can survive. However, it is also important to increase 
the organisational and bargaining capacity of workers in these and other sectors, because 
there is no automatic mechanism smoothly linking employment expansion to poverty 
reduction. Further, concentrating on those particular sectors (and geographical areas) will 
make it easier, in the context of scarce resources and fiscal constraints, to make some 
progress with the other policies recommended throughout this paper, including the 
construction and maintenance of health facilities and the recruitment and motivation of 
primary school teachers. 
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2.   Cross-Country Comparative Data on Labour Supply 
 
2.1 Introduction: Data Inadequacies 
 
Population Censuses and Labour Force Surveys are commonly used as primary 
sources of information on labour supply.  These sources are used throughout this Section.  
However, very few countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have carried out Labour Force 
Surveys (LFS) and Censuses are often outdated (Tables A1 and A11). Yet, many outdated 
Censuses have been used as sampling frames for Living Standards Measurement 
(Household Budget) Surveys  (LSMS) and for Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire 
Surveys (CWIQS), which are increasingly becoming the main source of information used 
for labour market policy making. In fact, more than 45 LSMS and 18 CWIQS have been 
completed or begun since the mid-1980s3, whereas only 10 LFS are included in the 
survey lists published by the World Bank. In 1994, a WB study on labour markets and 
structural adjustment only included three Sub-Saharan African country case studies 
(Kenya, Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire); of which just one was based on a labour force survey 
(Kenya). 
Nevertheless, Labour Force Surveys and Population Censuses remain the primary 
sources for the ILO database (LABORSTA http://laborsta.ilo.org), providing the data for 
measures of the economically active population, employment-to-population ratios and the 
growth of the labour force, by gender and age groups (Behrman and Rosenzweig, 1994: 
161). The response rates for a number of important indicators in Sub-Saharan Africa are 
low: zero percent for employment-to-population ratios, 14 percent for unemployment 
rates and 2 percent for youth unemployment rates (Schaible and Mahadevan-Vijaya, 
2002: 2). The gaps in the data, both for individual countries and periods of time, have two 
implications. First, many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have no reliable data on labour 
supply and we know practically nothing about labour demand and labour market 
dynamics in these countries. Second, the data shown for the countries covered are often 
based on estimates and projections that rely on brave assumptions concerning population 
dynamics (natural rates of growth, age composition and migration), as well as on 
assumptions about the distribution of the labour force by sector, occupation and status.  
                                                 
3 There are also up to 66 income and expenditure surveys recorded in the African Monitoring Database, but 
many of these surveys do not include information on employment.  
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It is, therefore, hardly surprising that different agencies publish very different 
estimates for key labour market statistics.  For example, African Development Indicators 
2003 shows interpolated data on the labour force (economically active population) for a 
complete time series. The ILO database presents data from the primary sources, so not all 
years are included. In Ethiopia, it is striking to note that the World Bank records a labour 
force of nearly 17 million people in 1980, while according to the ILO database there are 
only 14 million economically active people. In a number of random checks for the sample 
of countries covered in this paper similar inconsistencies appear between these two data 
sources, which is surprising because the ILO is cited as the source for the World Bank 
series. 
  This Section provides a cross-country comparative analysis of the underlying 
demographic determinants of the total labour supply.  Trends in the quantity of labour 
supplied by adults, children and youth are discussed in the subsequent sub-Sections.  It is 
regrettable that more reliable data were not available, particularly to analyse the impact of 
HIV/AIDS on labour supplies.  The starting point for any analysis of the impact of 
HIV/AIDS should be recent data on prevalence and mortality rates. Unfortunately, there 
is remarkably little good quality information available that would enable the levels and 
thus trends in national HIV prevalence rates to be accurately monitored (Bennell, 2003a).  
No country in Sub-Saharan Africa collects reliable “vital registration” data on deaths.4  
As a consequence, all figures describing the number of AIDS-related deaths in Africa are 
estimates of some kind (Ngom and Clark, 2003: 3). UNAIDS warn that their published 
estimates of HIV prevalence should be viewed as having an accuracy of +/- 25 percent 
(Zaba et al, 2003: 13).  
There is little population-based survey data providing information on age and 
gender-specific HIV infection rates by location and socio-economic background.  Instead, 
HIV prevalence estimates rely on the testing of those pregnant women who attend public 
sector antenatal clinics (ANCs).  This is not an accurate method for measuring national, 
age-specific, or male prevalence levels.  Inaccuracies arise because: 
• Sentinel surveillance in ANC clinics has an inherent selection bias against women 
using modern contraceptives.  Women who have adopted consistent condom use 
are less likely to become pregnant and to attend the clinics. 
                                                 
4 Even in South Africa the registration of adult deaths remains incomplete, there are long delays in 
publishing official statistics, and there is unreliable certification of AIDS (Bradshaw et al, 2004). 
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• In the countries with more mature epidemics, there is some concern that ANC data 
may underestimate HIV prevalence, because of falling fertility among HIV 
positive women (Whiteside et al, 2003:10-11).  If fertility is considerably lower 
among HIV-positive women, available estimates of HIV prevalence may be 
downwardly biased (United Nations, 2004c: 26). 
• Rural data are biased towards larger villages and settlements close to towns and 
roads.  Rural samples tend to be small and have often been biased towards more 
seriously affected rural areas (Dyson, 2003: 428).  Very poor rural women and 
those living in more remote rural areas are less likely to attend antenatal clinics, as 
suggested by the data in Table 10. 
It is hoped that the inclusion of HIV-testing of adults in the more recent DHS 
nationwide population-based samples in Malawi, Kenya and Uganda will provide more 
accurate estimates of age- and location-specific prevalence.  However, both DHS and 
ANC data have to be combined with population census data to estimate national 
prevalence rates. If the last census is judged to have been unreliable, DHS may be forced 
to use another sampling frame, such as the electoral lists in Mozambique; but these 
electoral lists may well not be accurate.5   
Moreover, as noted above, the published population census data for many Sub-
Saharan African countries are often five or more years old (US Census Bureau, 2004), 
e.g. in Swaziland, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Cote D'Ivoire and Ethiopia.  Large 
population shifts may have taken place in the intervening years (see below, Section 5), as 
a result of war, famine and forced migration, and changes in fundamental demographic 
variables such as fertility rates may have been faster than expected.   There are, in 
addition, several other problems with the African population census data used to derive 
not only estimates of HIV prevalence, but also all labour force estimates.  Undercounting 
may be caused by logistical difficulties, accessibility and risk; misreporting is difficult to  
                                                 
5 In the recent DHS for Nigeria the sampling frame was the list of enumeration areas developed for the 
dated and unreliable 1991 Population Census (DHS, 2004, 211). Other evidence suggests that the quality of 
data collected in the Nigerian DHS may be low (Case et al, 2002, 6). 
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correct in the absence of alternative cross-checking lists;6 and censorship by governments 
may affect the published estimates of the regional breakdown of the population.  In sum, 
the combination of unreliable prevalence data with unreliable population census data is 
bound to exacerbate the problem of interpreting the results. 
Projections of the impact of HIV on the labour supply need strong assumptions 
about the distribution of the time of progression from HIV infections to AIDS and from 
AIDS to death. Very small changes in the assumptions made regarding progression time 
have important effects on projected mortality, but it is acknowledged that there is a great 
deal of uncertainty about the reliability of the particular assumptions made by UNAIDS 
and used in the Population Division's 2004 projections of the impact of HIV (United 
Nations, 2004c: 26). Similarly, for its projections of labour supply, the ILO has made 
assumptions about the duration of the periods when individuals are first partially and 
eventually fully unable to work without treatment and before death.  Thus, they define a 
stage during which a person living with HIV/AIDS is bedridden for up to 50 percent of 
the time and can only work for 50 percent of the time (Stage3); and another, when a 
person is bedridden for more than 50 percent of the time and cannot work at all. However, 
the ILO admits that its assumptions are based on "a very small" body of literature on the 
progression of HIV/AIDS from the onset of symptoms to death (ILO, 2004a: 67).  The 
first empirical evidence available on the impact of HIV/AIDS on labour productivity, also 
published in 2004, suggests that pre-AIDS morbidity affects the ability and productivity 
of infected workers over a substantially longer period of time than has previously been 
recognised (Fox et al, 2004:323). 
Unfortunately, the problems in projecting the size and timing of the impact of 
HIV/AIDS on women, men and children in different Sub-Saharan African countries are 
much more complex than suggested in the previous paragraphs (Ngom and Clark, 2003; 
Zaba et al, 2003; Gregson et al, 2002). For example, these projections depend on weakly 
grounded assumptions about population-specific behavioural factors, such as current and 
future sexual networking preferences, as well as on assumptions about vertical  
                                                 
6 Even in countries with sophisticated census facilities, such as South Africa and the USA, “illegal” 
backyard shack residents or migrant workers are often undercounted (Wittenberg, 2004; Lobo, 2002).  In 
Sub-Saharan Africa, interviewers and respondents can have differing interpretations of the concept of “a 
person who is usually resident”, because of difficulties of defining this concept in contexts where the 
population is extremely mobile and the complex patterns of household formation do not conform to the 
stereotype of stable, nuclear families (Chamie, 1994). 
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transmission rates under different treatment regimes in the future. Projections also depend 
upon future trends in conflict and violence in Sub-Saharan Africa, since wars are known 
to spread infection (Section 5). But it is difficult to conceive a method of predicting the 
outbreak of wars. As Keynes noted when referring to the prospects of a European war, 
"About these matters there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable 
probability whatever. We simply do not know!" (Keynes, 1937, 241).  
2.2 Basic Demographic Characteristics: Population Size, Growth Rates and Age 
Composition 
 
Despite the data limitations noted above, there is little doubt that the basic 
demographic characteristics that will continue to influence the supply of labour, both the 
absolute supply and its quality, differ very substantially between the economies of Sub-
Saharan Africa.  This is true not only in the trivial sense that the current working age 
population is, for example, about 25 times larger in Ethiopia than in Swaziland, Lesotho 
or Mauritania; there are also significant differences in the recent and projected growth 
rates of the population and labour force between countries.  For example, between 2000 
and 2005, the estimated annual rate of growth of population in Uganda is 3.24 percent 
and in Mauritania, Ethiopia, Senegal and Ghana it is well over two percent, whereas in 
Lesotho it is barely positive (0.14 percent) and in five other countries in our sample it is 
only 1.6 percent or below (Table 1).  
The current age structure and, therefore, the proportion of the population of 
working age (defined here as the population aged between 15 and 59 years) is also very 
different across African countries, as is the distribution of the population between rural 
and urban areas.  For example, only 12 percent of Uganda's population was urban in 
2003, compared to 62 percent of the population in Mauritania; differences between 
African countries in recent and projected annual rates of change in the urban proportion 
of the population are equally stark, with projected rates for 2005-2010 of above 2.4 
percent in Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique and Tanzania, compared to rates of about one 
percent or below in several other countries in the sample (Table 2).  
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Table 1: Total Population and Population Growth Rates, 2000-2005 
Total Population  
2005 
(Thousands) 
 
Annual Population Growth (%) 
Years: 2000-2005 
(Medium Variant) 
  
Cote d'Ivoire 17,165 
 1.62 
  
Ethiopia 74,189 
 2.46 
  
Ghana 21,833 
 2.17 
  
Kenya 32,849 
 1.45 
  
Lesotho 1,797 
 0.14 
  
Malawi 12,572 
 2.01 
  
Mauritania 3,069 
 2.98 
  
Mozambique 19,495 
 1.75 
  
Senegal 10,587 
 2.39 
  
South Africa 45,323 
 0.59 
  
Swaziland 1,087 
 0.80 
  
Tanzania 38,365 
 1.93 
  
Uganda 27,623 
 3.24 
  
Zambia 11,043 
 1.16 
  
Sub-Saharan Africa 732,510 
 2.28 
Source:  United Nations (2004b).  
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Table 2: Urbanization in 2003 and Projected Rates of Urbanization, 2005-2010a 
 
Percentage of the 
Population Urban 
(2003) 
Annual Rate of Change of 
Percentage Urban 2005-
2010 (%) 
Cote d'Ivoire 45 1.1 
Ethiopia 16 1.9 
Ghana 45 1.0 
Kenya 40 2.4 
Lesotho 18 1.2 
Malawi 16 2.6 
Mauritania 62 1.6 
Mozambique 36 2.7 
Senegal 50 1.3 
South Africa 57 0.8 
Swaziland 24 1.0 
Tanzania 35 2.5 
Uganda 12 1.1 
Zambia 36 1.1 
Africa (2005) 
 
 
40 3.4 
 
 
      Source:  United Nations (2004a). 
    a In this and many other tables of this paper numbers have been rounded from the original source. 
 
 
While most economies in Sub-Saharan Africa contain a relatively large proportion 
of young people, reflected in a median age of only 17.5 years (compared to a median age 
of 26 years in Asia), there is a wide disparity in the median ages of the populations of 
different Sub-Saharan African economies.  For example, the median age in Uganda in 
2000 was estimated as 15.1 years, compared to 18.8 years in Ghana and Lesotho, and 
22.6 years in South Africa. Thus, in several countries only a low percentage (50 percent 
or less) of the population is of working age. The ILO has projected the dependency ratio 
(defined as dependents per 100 non-dependent persons in 2005) for 35 African 
economies, including most of those covered in this paper (Table 3). Unsurprisingly, this 
ratio is much higher in Uganda (112) than, e.g., in Ghana (73) or South Africa (57).  The 
projected percentage increase in the population of working age over the period 2000 to 
2010 ranges from 35.6 percent in Uganda to 17.8 percent in Mozambique and to only 5.2 
percent in Lesotho (UNCTAD, 2004: Table 19). 
The HIV/AIDS pandemic will have a major impact on the age and sex 
composition and the rates of growth of the population and labour force of Sub-Saharan 
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African economies. The scale, scope and timing of the impact on the quantity and quality 
of labour supplied are extremely difficult to estimate precisely, but will certainly be 
different in each country. This Section of this paper will present some evidence on the 
impact of HIV/AIDS on the quantity of labour supplied in different Sub-Saharan African 
countries, focussing initially on the supply of prime age adults, before turning to the 
supplies of child and youth labour. The following Section will focus on the productivity 
or quality of the anticipated supplies of labour in different countries in the first decades of 
the twenty first century.  
 
  Table 3:  Median Age, the Working Age Population as a Percentage of the Total
 Population, and Projected Dependency Ratios 
 
Working Age Population as % 
Total Population 
(2000)* 
Median Age 
 of the 
 Total Population 
(2000)* 
Projected Dependency Ratio: 
Dependents per 100 
Nondependent Persons 
(2005)** 
Cote d'Ivoire 52.3 18.1 78 
Ethiopia 49.5 16.9 93 
Ghana 53.9 18.8 73 
Kenya 52.4 17.7 76 
Lesotho 52.6 18.8 79 
Malawi 49.2 17.1 101 
Mauritania 51.4 18.2 … 
Mozambique 50.9 17.8 88 
Senegal 51.8 17.6 … 
South Africa 60.1 22.6 57 
Swaziland 50.9 17.4 87 
Tanzania … 16.8 88 
Uganda 46.2 15.1 112 
Zambia 51.4 16.7 99 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
50.9 17.5 
 
87 
    Asia (5 Countries)  26.1 49** 
       Eastern Asia 64.9 30.8  
South-Central Asia  57.4 22.4  
Sources:  *United Nations (2003); ** (ILO, 2004a: 74). 
 
2.3 The Impact of HIV/AIDS on the Prime Age Adult Labour Supply 
 
In many of the high prevalence countries in Southern Africa, less than 40 percent 
of current survivors to age 15 will celebrate their sixtieth birthdays (Ngom and Clark, 
2003: 2).7  For both females and males of working age, higher national HIV prevalence 
rates increase the probability of dying between the ages of 20 and 60, but the impact on 
                                                 
7 In Botswana, for example, it is predicted that by 2025 more than half of the potential population aged 35-59 will have 
been lost to AIDS (United Nations, 2004c: 21). 
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females in this age group generally occurs at younger ages and is more focused on a 
narrow age band (ibid: 7).  Thus, throughout Sub-Saharan Africa young women (aged 15-
24 years) are twice as likely as young men to be living with HIV/AIDS (UNICEF, 
http://www.unicef.org/lifeskills/index.html ).  Recent South African data indicate even greater 
gender disparities, with females in this age group being 3 times more likely to be infected 
than males (Bradshaw et al, 2004:140). About a quarter of the slightly older young adult 
females (aged between 20 and 24 years) are HIV positive in South Africa, compared to 
only 7.6 percent of males in the same age group (RHRU, 2004: 29). A smaller survey in 
Kenya found that over 27 percent of girls aged 15-19 were infected with HIV compared 
to 4.6 percent of boys in the same age group (Glynn et al, 2001).   
In high prevalence countries such as South Africa, as well as in areas like Kisumu 
(Kenya), the death of large numbers of relatively young adult females has important 
short- and medium-term implications for the age composition of female labour supplies 
and for the care-giving obligations of older women, who will devote years of labour to 
washing, feeding and nursing the chronically ill (Steinberg et al, 2002:15).  There are also 
important implications for the children of this large group of women, since they will 
receive relatively few years of maternal care.  The implication is that the nutritional status 
and the quality of the future labour force will be adversely affected.8 Children will be 
deprived "of those very things they need to become economically productive adults – 
their parents’ loving care, knowledge and capacity to finance education" (Bell et al, 
2003:92).   
These inter-generational productivity effects will probably have more obvious and 
serious economic consequences than those suggested by the aggregative quantitative 
changes in labour supply projected by the ILO.  The proportion of the total labour force 
that will have died as a result of HIV/AIDS by 2005 appears to be quite small in Sub-
Saharan Africa as a whole (3.2 percent), according to ILO definitions of the labour force 
and ILO projections,9 although this proportion is obviously much higher in some 
countries than others (Table 4). 
                                                 
8 Household expenditures on child-related goods – in particular on healthy foods – are lower when a child's 
biological mother is absent (Case et al, 2002: 2). 
9 The ILO defines the “labour force” as the sum of all persons who are economically active—a formal definition 
encompassing all persons of working age who are in paid employment, gainful self-employment, or unemployed, but 
available for and seeking work. The labour force is quantified by summing the products of economic activity rates 
estimated by the ILO for each age and sex group and the population weights of the same age and sex groups (ILO, 
2004a: 4).   
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Table 4:  Estimated and Projected Labour 
Force Losses as a Result of HIV/AIDS 
Countries in 
Alphabetical Order 
Estimated number of 
persons 15-64 years in the 
labour force who 
are HIV positive in 2003 
Projected Cumulative mortality losses to 
the total labour force as a result of 
HIV/AIDS, as an equivalent proportion of 
the total labour force, 2005 
Côte d’Ivoire 399,400 5.2 
Ethiopia   1,336,766 2.1 
Ghana 292,297 1.5 
Kenya  1,003,534 4.2 
Lesotho  211,300 8.3 
Malawi  737,700 6.9 
Mozambique  1,128,500 2.4 
South Africa   3,698,827 2.5 
Swaziland  134,100 4.9 
Uganda  454,242 8.4 
Tanzania  1,401,300 3.3 
Zambia  726,800 10.2 
Total (Sub-Saharan  Africa, 35 
Countries, Weighted ) 
18,610,517 3.2 
Total (Asia, 5 countries) 4,886,600 0.2 
Source: ILO, 2004a. 
 
There is disaggregated evidence to suggest that the risk of HIV-related death is 
particularly high for those young female adults who have few years of education 
(UNICEF, 2004b).  Thus, in South Africa, among those adults aged 20-24, HIV positive 
females had completed significantly fewer years of education than HIV negative females.  
Condom use was much lower among rural (less educated) than urban (more educated) 
youth in South Africa.  Higher levels of education have often been associated with 
condom use elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa (RHRU, 2004: 33; Luke, 2002:9-10).10   
There is also strong evidence that the children of poorly educated mothers are at relatively 
high risk of malnutrition and illiteracy (Smith and Haddad, 1999).  The policy implication 
is that resources need to be focused on young  
females who are at risk of failing to attend school or of early school dropout, who are 
concentrated in the rural areas of Sub-Saharan Africa.  Unfortunately, health and 
education expenditures are not currently concentrated on these rural young women 
(Section 3); the consequences for the quality of the labour that will be supplied by their 
children are extremely serious. 
                                                                                                                                                  
 
10 Despite the efficacy and low cost of condoms there has been remarkably little effort to increase the 
supply of condoms to poor rural Africans.  The number of condoms available per man aged 15-59 per year 
averages only 4.6 in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Donor funding of condom supply has not increased in the period 
since 1995 (Shelton and Johnston, 2004)  
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2.4 The Impact of HIV/AIDS on Child Labour Supply 
 
Estimating the effect of HIV/AIDS on potential child labour supply depends, in 
part, on being able to assess the trend in child mortality among uninfected children.  The 
United Nations Population Division projections indicate that child mortality among 
uninfected children is declining at very different rates in different Sub-Saharan African 
countries and that these countries also exhibit marked disparities in initial levels of child 
mortality.  These differing "background" trends may exacerbate or mask the deterioration 
in mortality that is attributable to HIV.  For example, a country with a high "background" 
level of child mortality, such as Malawi (Table 5), may continue to experience an overall 
decline in child mortality in the face of HIV, if it manages to sustain the rapid rate of 
decline in non-HIV related child mortality that it achieved in recent years.   
In contrast, in countries with relatively low initial levels of child mortality (and 
high HIV prevalence) such as Botswana, child mortality has risen very sharply and HIV 
attributable mortality is now over 50 percent.  In Uganda, declines in "background" 
mortality coincide with an estimated decrease in HIV prevalence, with the result that the 
fraction of child mortality attributable to HIV is declining.  These contrasts in the 
proportion of overall child mortality that is attributable to HIV in different countries are 
illustrated in Figure 1.  It may be concluded that trends in child mortality will differ 
between countries, not only because of the marked differences in the rates at which HIV 
prevalence increases, but also because of differences in non-HIV related child mortality.  
It is clear that expenditures to reduce non-HIV mortality could continue to play a major 
role in overall child mortality reduction in several African countries, quite apart from 
expenditures on the available cost-effective treatments to reduce rates of mother to child 
HIV-transmission (Wilkinson et al, 2000).     
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Figure 1:   HIV Population Attributable Fraction of Child Mortality, 
1990 to 2001 
  
Source: Zaba et al, 2003: 10. 
 
In addition to the epidemiological and demographic factors differentially affecting 
future supplies of child labour, there is patchy evidence from studies sponsored by the 
ILO that some countries are much more likely to provide child entrants to the labour 
market than others. In other words, the proportion of children who work, as a percentage 
of the age cohort, appears to vary a great deal between countries (Table 5, Column 3).  
This variation suggests that the circumstances that produce child labour are not 
immutable across the African region and that there is scope for government policy to 
reduce child labour. 
However, not all of the work performed by children falls under the definition of 
“Child Labour” used by the ILO and incorporated in Table 5 (Column 4).  Their approach 
excludes children engaged in work considered to be non-economic in nature, for example, 
domestic work within the household.  However, such "non-economic" activities may 
themselves be substantial enough to prevent a child from attending school and so the use 
of the ILO definition is likely to bias downwards estimates of relevant child labour with a 
particular impact on the estimates of girls who are involved in a detrimental level of 
domestic work (Basu & Tzannatos, 2003:156).  This concern applies more widely, with 
many other labour force or child labour surveys failing to consider the full range of types 
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of work done by children, including not only domestic work, but also seasonal piece work 
as part of mother-child agricultural labour teams.   
 
Table 5:  Working children aged 5 to 17, in thousands  
(percent of cohort shown in brackets) 
Country 
Year of 
survey 
Total economically 
active (including 
“light” work) 
Child labourers 
(economic 
activities only) 
Total active 
(economic and non-
economic) 
     
Ethiopia 2001 9,463 (52%) n.a. 15,468 (85%) 
Ghana 2001 2,475 (39%) 1,273 (20%) 5,661 (89%) 
Kenya 1998/9 1, 894 (17%) 1, 305 (12%) n.a. 
Namibia 1999 72 (16%) n.a. n.a. 
S. Africa 1999 1,979 (15%) 1,136 (8%) 6,040 (45%) 
Tanzania 2000/1 4,736 (40%) 1,168 (10%) n.a. 
Uganda 2000/1 2,677 (34%) n.a. n.a. 
Zambia 1999 595 (16%) n.a. n.a. 
Zimbabwe 1999 1,226 (26%) 356 (8%) n.a. 
Sources:  Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 2001, Ghana Statistical Service 2003, Republic of Kenya 2001, 
Namibia Ministry of Labour 2000, Statistics South Africa 2001, Tanzania Ministry of Labour, Youth Development & 
Sports nd, Ugandan Bureau of Statistics nd, Republic of Zambia n.d., Zimbabwe nd  
 
 
The inclusion of household work can lead to significant differences in the data on 
the overall number of working children, and on the gender burden of work.  For example, 
the Ethiopia 2001 Child Labour Report (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 2001) 
finds that 85 percent of the 5-17 age group is involved in some kind of work, if "non-
economic" activities are included (Table 5, Column 5). This falls to 52 percent if only 
directly productive activities are included.  Considering only directly productive 
activities, 62 percent of boys are active and 42 percent of girls. However, the situation is 
reversed when housekeeping activities are taken into account, as these are dominated by 
girls (with an activity rate of 44% for girls compared to 23% for boys).   
Also excluded from the ILO data on child labour are those children who are 
economically active between the ages of 12 and 14, when they are considered to be 
engaged in light work (defined as less than 14 hours a week). Table 5 provides separate 
estimates of the number of all economically active children, including those engaged in 
light work (Column 3), as well the ILO's estimates of child labour (Column 4). It also 
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provides the few survey estimates of the total number of active children that include 
children involved in "non-economic" activities (Column 5).11   
As well as substantial differences between African countries, the ILO-sponsored 
studies also show substantial differences in the supply of child labour within countries.  
These are complex; they cannot be simplified into a rural-urban dichotomy, or 
summarised by reference to the characteristics of children living in poorer as opposed to 
wealthier households.12 In fact, studies in different countries do not agree on the degree to 
which household poverty can explain the pattern of child labour.  Early entry into the 
labour market and incomplete basic education depend on changing sets of factors that are 
likely to vary from household to household and to be affected by changes in demand and 
supply conditions, as well as by the pattern of state expenditure on schooling and rural 
infrastructure.13  For example, survey data from the Kagera region of Tanzania indicate 
that households increased their use of child labour in response to sharp declines in the 
total value of crops farmed due to pests, diseases and calamities such as fires (Beegle et 
al, 2003).  Similarly, a study based on LSMS data from Cote d’Ivoire suggests that 
economic recession led to a contra-cyclical general rise in child economic activity 
(Grootaert, 1998:13).  Grootaert identified five key factors which affected a household’s 
decision to supply child labour: the age and gender of the child, the education and 
employment status of parents, the availability of within household employment 
opportunities, the household’s poverty status and its geographic location.  Not only was 
labour market participation likely to increase with age of the child, but there were also 
clear trends by gender, with girls less likely to attend school and more likely to engage in 
household tasks.  In rural areas, having a female household-head meant that a child was 
                                                 
11 It should be noted that the surveys that were the sources for the data in Table 5 did not always use the same 
approaches and definitions.  They are not strictly comparable and cannot be an adequate basis for published estimates of 
the percentage of the cohort aged 5 to 14 years that is working in the Sub-Saharan African region as a whole (Table 
A13).     
12 Many of the studies provide a rural-urban breakdown of the data and these show that the prevalence of 
child labour is often higher in rural areas.  For example, the Zambian survey found that only 5 percent of 
children were likely to be economically active in urban areas, compared to 23 percent in rural areas 
(Republic of Zambia n.d.:25).  Participation rates also varied widely by province, with a participation rate 
of 25 percent in Southern province and one of only 4 percent in Lusaka province.  The South African study 
produced more detailed disaggregated data, reporting the prevalence of children working in either 
productive or domestic tasks in a formal urban area (23 percent), informal urban area (23 percent), 
commercial farming area (48 percent) and other rural area (64 percent) (Statistics South Africa 2001:35).  
Other studies have shown marked differences between child workers within the same country in term of the 
sectors in which they work and their age- and gender-specific participation rates. 
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more likely to work.  In addition, parents with no or low education were more likely to 
have children engaged in work.  Grootaert describes the presence of household 
enterprises as a ‘double-edged sword’ (ibid, 1998:65).  On the one hand, increased 
income will decrease the likelihood that a child will work, although he noted that 
ownership of a household enterprise was a positive correlate of poverty in Cote d’Ivoire.  
On the other hand, the presence of a household enterprise meant that it was more likely 
that a child would work.   
Similarly, an econometric analysis of Ghanaian data (Canagarajah and Coulombe, 
1997) suggests that poverty is not the main factor behind child labour, with a statistically 
weak relationship (see also Nielsen 1998, who finds no positive relationship between 
poverty and child labour in Zambia).  Instead, family characteristics had a strong role to 
play in the decision over school or work, with households who earned a larger share of 
their income from family enterprises, farming or otherwise, having a higher child labour 
participation rate (ibid: 27).14    
Another study of Ghanaian data contradicts some of these conclusions and does 
find a positive relationship between poverty and child labour, as well as evidence of a 
gender gap in child labour linked to poverty, with girls as a group as well as across urban, 
rural and poverty sub-samples being consistently more likely to engage in harmful child 
labour than boys (Blunch and Verner, 2000: 3).  Similarly, an econometric analysis of the 
ILO data on economic activity within SSA countries finds a strong and significant 
statistical relationship between the incidence of poverty and the prevalence of child 
economic activity (Admassie, 2002:267).  Whilst the impact was small, poverty was one 
of the most significant variables arising from his study.15  
                                                                                                                                                  
13 The influence of state expenditure on schooling on the age-specific participation rates of girls in the 
casual agricultural wage labour markets in India and, therefore, on real wages and poverty in rural India, 
has been explored by Sen and Ghosh (1993). 
14This result is supported by Bhalotra & Heady’s (2003) analysis of an early Ghanaian living standard 
survey.  These authors found that girls in land rich households were more likely to work than girls in land 
poor households.    
15 Admassie also suggests that differing agricultural technologies within SSA could provide another 
explanatory variable for divergent patterns of child labour prevalence. His conclusion is that promoting 
improved agricultural technologies that are less unskilled-labour intensive would have the effect of 
reducing the demand for child labour as well as playing an important role in reducing poverty.  However, 
historical studies of the impact of technological change on child labour in the developed countries suggest 
that early technological change was often facilitated by the use of child labour, and that later changes that 
appeared to discourage child labour were often bolstered by legislation (Humphries, 2001:181-2). 
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The supply of child migrant labour from Benin, where 8 percent of all rural 
children aged between 6 and 16 years have left their parental households to work (half  
of them leaving for other countries, with boys heading for plantations in the Cote D'Ivoire 
and the girls mainly looking for domestic service in Gabon), cannot be explained by the 
relative poverty of the migrant-sending households. In fact, relatively wealthy rural 
households may be more likely to be able to finance such migrations (Andvig et al, 2001: 
13). Elsewhere, when long-distance migration is not involved, there is evidence that rural 
child domestic servants do come from extremely poor households, or are orphans (Sender 
et al, 2004).  Since the market for domestic servants is probably the most extensive 
market for child labour in Sub-Saharan Africa, it is remarkable how little research has 
been conducted into the poverty of the households supplying the children concerned, into 
remittance behaviour, or into these children's real wages and working conditions.  The 
economic history of the developed economies suggests that a very high and increasing 
proportion of young girls will, over the next few decades of economic development in 
Africa, enter the labour market as domestic servants (Roberts, 1995; Vickery, 1998; Bras, 
2003). 
There has also been little research that focuses on the specific issue of the impact 
of HIV/AIDS on the labour market participation of children.  The ILO has not attempted 
to include child labour in its estimates of the impact of HIV on the projected size of the 
labour force.  Its recent projections of the HIV-affected and non-affected labour force are 
based on the numbers of people defined as economically active between the ages of 15 
and 64 years, ignoring the labour force aged between 5 and 14 years (ILO, 2004a: 66).  
The few available micro-studies of the effects of HIV/AIDS on rural households have 
typically been confined to geographic areas known to have high HIV prevalence.  Their 
findings cannot, therefore, be extrapolated to a national scale. Besides, they suggest that 
rural responses to the death of a prime age adult are heterogeneous, with affected 
households replacing agricultural labour through the arrival of new adult members, 
through labour hiring and by changing their cropping patterns and varying the input mix, 
rather than by resorting to child labour (Mather et al, 2004).  
Micro data from 24 districts in rural Kenya suggest that households adjust, after 
experiencing the death of a working age female (who is not the head of the household or 
the female spouse of the head of household), by attracting “boys” into the household.  
The labour of these newly resident young male relatives appears to substitute for the tasks 
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previously performed by the deceased woman, although no information is provided on 
whether or not these boys should be considered as new entrants into the child labour force 
(Yamano and Jayne, 2004:102).16 A larger scale study in Tanzania found that, “Analysis 
of farm and chore hours across demographic groups generally found small and 
insignificant changes in labor supply of individuals in households experiencing a prime-
age adult death. The lack of an increase in hours … is notable for children in particular 
for whom deaths are presumed to result in higher farm hours assuming there will be an 
acute shortage of farm labor” (Beegle, 2003:24-5).17 
Thus, there is no reliable direct evidence suggesting that AIDS orphans are more 
likely than other orphans or children to enter the market for child labour. Whether or not 
children and orphans enter labour markets appears to be context specific, with some 
orphans and AIDS orphans having access to household or extended family resources that 
enable them to avoid premature entry, even if they experience serious emotional distress 
and other, long-term adverse consequences. Nevertheless, the HIV/AIDS epidemic is 
clearly having a massive impact on the total number of orphans in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
At the end of 2001, the proportion of orphans in SSA who were AIDS orphans has been 
estimated at 32 percent. By 2010, it has been estimated that the proportion will be 48 
percent. Those countries with the highest prevalence of HIV already have the highest 
prevalence of orphans, although countries that have experienced violent conflict, such as 
Mozambique and Rwanda, also have a large proportion of children who are orphaned 
(Grassley and Timaeus, 2003, 4-6).  
The percentage of the relevant age group (0-14 years) that is orphaned varies 
dramatically between countries, from less than 6 percent (Ghana) to 12 percent or more in 
Uganda and Mozambique (ibid: 10).  The ILO estimates the absolute number  
                                                 
16 Another Kenyan micro study refers to anecdotal evidence that those workers on tea estates who were 
suffering as a result of HIV/AIDS were more likely than a control group of workers to "bring helpers" with 
them to pluck tea (Fox et al, 2004: 323).  It is likely that some of these family "helpers" were children. 
17 Another Tanzanian study, comparing the 2000/01 Integrated Labor Force Survey with results from the 
1990/91 Labor Force Survey, comes to different, though tentative, conclusions.  The authors found a 
dramatic increase in labour force participation rates for children aged 10-14, and a much milder increase for 
those aged 15-19, while education transition matrices drawn from enrolment data suggest an increased 
tendency during the 1990s to exit primary school.  However, these two labour force surveys are not 
comparable.  Therefore the recorded increase in child labour participation in the period between the surveys 
may not, in fact, reflect the spread of the epidemic or labour market realities (Arndt and Wobst, 2002: 8-9).  
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of orphans in Sub-Saharan Africa as a result of HIV/AIDS in 2003 (12 million),18 but the 
inter-country range is striking, from only 65,000 children in Swaziland to about one 
million children in Uganda, Tanzania and South Africa (Table 6). 
                  Table 6: HIV Prevalence and Numbers of Orphans, 2003 
Countries in 
Alphabetical Order  
Estimated HIV Prevalence 
in Persons 15-49 Years (%) 
2003 
Estimated Total Number of 
Orphans (0-17 Years) as result 
of HIV/AIDS 
2003 
 
Côte d’Ivoire  
 
7.0 
 
310,000 
Ethiopia   4.4 720,000 
Ghana   3.1 170,000 
Kenya  6.7 650,000 
Lesotho  28.9 100,000 
Malawi  14.2 500,000 
Mozambique  12.2 470,000 
South Africa   21.5 1,100,000 
Swaziland  38.8 65,000 
Uganda  4.1 940,000 
United Republic of Tanzania  8.8 980,000 
Zambia  16.5 630.000 
Total (Sub-Saharan Africa,  35 Countries,  
Weighted ) 
7.7 
 
12,016,300 
Total (Asia, 5 countries) 0.4 
 
2,053,000 
       Source: ILO, 2004: 88-9 
 
In most Sub-Saharan African countries, a high proportion (about half) of all 
orphans is currently in the age-group 10-14 years. Therefore, large numbers of orphaned 
children may confidently be expected to enter labour markets in the next few years. The 
quality of these new entrants, the degree to which their orphan status will directly have 
compromised their health, nutrition and levels of education, is a key policy issue. This is 
discussed below (Section 3.2), after examining the more general question of the scale of 
projected increases in the supply of youth to the labour market. 
 
2.5 The Impact of HIV/AIDS on the Labour Supply of Youth 
 
The relatively high proportion of young people in the working age population of 
all Sub-Saharan African economies compared to other developing regions has  
                                                 
18 This estimate is obviously much smaller than the available estimates for the total number of orphans. 
These estimates vary from 35 million to 47 million depending on the age range of the children included 
(Grassley and Timaeus, 2003). The causal processes determining the total number of orphans – conflict, 
natural disaster, maternal death, malaria etc. and AIDS, are complex and interact with one another. 
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already been noted (Table 3), as have the important differences in age-composition across 
African economies. Fertility rates in Sub-Saharan Africa are, in general, declining at a 
slower rate than in other developing regions and the share of youth, (i.e. 15-24 year olds), 
in the total population of working age in the sub-continent is projected to remain more or 
less constant at about 36 percent between 2000 and 2015.  This is a very much higher 
share for youth than, for example, in the South-Eastern Asian economies, where the youth 
share in the total working age population is projected to decline significantly by 2015 
(Table A2).   
Despite the appalling effects of HIV/AIDS mortality on young people and 
especially young females, the increase in the size of the youth labour force in Sub-
Saharan Africa up to 2015 (28.2 percent) is still projected to be about as great as the 
increase in the adult (25+ years) labour force.  This is in marked contrast to other 
developing regions, where the youth labour force will increase by less than 3 percent, 
compared to an increase of over 26 percent in the adult labour force (Table A2). Figure 2 
provides a graphic illustration of the historic growth in the difference between the share 
of young people in the population of Africa and the share of young people in the 
populations of other developing regions. 
 
Figure 2: Median Age of the population in Africa, Asia and Latin America 
 
Source: Berthélemy, 2004: 25 
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The slow rate of increase in the labour supply of youth in some non-African 
developing regions is not only attributable to more rapidly declining fertility trends, but 
also to the fact that more youths are staying in education for longer (ILO, 2004b: 6).  
Therefore, in the Sub-Saharan African context, there is scope for policies to reduce the 
very rapid rate of growth in the number of new young entrants into the labour market.  In 
the short- to medium-term, a reduction in primary school dropout rates and an increase in 
the transition rate from earlier to later levels of the education system are the 
recommended supply reducing policies.  These policies are much more likely to be 
efficient in improving the quality of youth labour supplies than attempts to “keep young 
people off the streets” by offering training of various kinds for those who have already 
left school (Godfrey, 2003: 18). (Some of the inefficiencies of expenditures on youth 
training, as well as the pro-rich bias of other policies aimed at improving the quality of 
young labour market entrants, will be discussed in Section 4.4 below).   
 
2.6 Summary and Conclusions   
 
The starting point for analysing labour supply in Sub-Saharan Africa is that there 
are gaping holes in the available data and that published estimates of different 
international agencies sometimes conflict. A large number of countries in the region have 
no reliable information on labour supply. Moreover, the data on countries that are covered 
by Labour Force Surveys and Population Censuses are often based on estimates and 
projections relying on guesstimates about population dynamics and the distribution of the 
labour force by sector, occupation and status. In addition, there is remarkably little good 
quality information that would make possible an accurate monitoring of levels and trends 
in national HIV prevalence rates. The intersection of inadequate HIV data collection and 
widespread shortcomings in broader demographic data mean that policy makers are 
limited in their ability to understand accurately and effectively respond to labour supply 
issues in the region. 
Nonetheless, Section 2 has pieced together a coherent analytical story about the 
quantity dimension of labour supply in Sub-Saharan Africa. The overriding theme of this 
analysis is the striking inequalities in labour supply characteristics, both between 
countries and, in some ways even more importantly, within countries. This section 
concentrates particularly on inter-country variations, while later sections focus more 
sharply on intra-country inequalities.  
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The size of populations varies enormously and there are significant differences in 
the projected growth rates of these populations. The current age structure of the 
population, and hence the proportion of the population of working age, also varies 
significantly from country to country. Thus the median age of Ugandans, in 2000, was 
estimated at 15.1 years, compared to 18.8 years in Ghana and 22.6 years in South Africa. 
While only 12 percent of Uganda’s population was urban in 2003, 62 percent of 
Mauritanians lived in urban areas; and the urban population is projected to grow more 
rapidly in some countries (Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, and Tanzania) than in others 
(Cote d’Ivoire, South Africa, and Zambia).  
HIV/AIDS will continue to have a profound, though varying effect on many 
African countries. The direct impact is especially great on girls and women. Throughout 
Sub-Saharan Africa young women (aged 15-24) are twice as likely as young men to be 
living with HIV/AIDs, though in South Africa they are estimated to be three times more 
likely than young men to be infected. Especially in countries, and areas of countries, with 
very high prevalence, HIV/AIDS has complex implications not just for the age 
composition of the female labour force but also for wider and inter-generational 
implications for the quantity and quality of labour supplies. Meanwhile, it is extremely 
difficult, given presently available evidence, accurately to assess and predict the impact of 
HIV/AIDS on child labour supplies. It is also difficult to extract this impact from the 
varying ‘background’ child mortality in uninfected children.  
The proportion of children, who work as a percentage of the age cohort, does 
seem to vary considerably between countries, which may suggest some scope for 
government policies to reduce the incidence of child labour. To some extent, children’s 
labour market participation is influenced by levels of poverty; however, there are other 
family characteristics that influence child labour supplies, and these sometimes appear 
stronger than income levels. Furthermore, there are dramatic differences between 
countries in the percentage of the relevant age group that is orphaned (e.g. less than 6 
percent in Ghana but more than 12 percent in Uganda and Mozambique) as well as in the 
absolute numbers of orphans. 
There is a relatively high proportion of young people in the working age 
population of all Sub-Saharan African countries, compared to other developing regions; 
this proportion is expected to remain fairly constant between 2000 and 2015, while it is 
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projected to decline, e.g., in South-Eastern Asia. Differences in fertility rates clearly 
affect this phenomenon. However, it is also affected by the fact that more youths stay in 
education longer in other developing regions. Therefore, education policies may be 
effective in counteracting the effect of the relatively slow decline in fertility rates in Sub-
Saharan Africa. These policies would need to focus on reducing primary school dropout 
rates and increasing the transition from lower to higher levels of education.  
   
3. The Quality of Labour in the Future: Nutrition, Health, and Educational 
Status 
 
3.1 Cross-Country Comparative Data: Life Expectancy, Literacy, Nutrition and 
Mortality 
 
At the most basic level, since productivity is partly determined by years of 
experience in work, relatively short working lives, or a small share of older people in the 
population aged 15-64 years (see Table 3), mean that low levels of life expectancy are 
likely to have directly adverse effects on labour productivity. Moreover, life expectancy 
may also be considered a good proxy for several other aspects of individuals' welfare that 
will influence their capacity to work productively, including their nutritional status and 
morbidity, etc (McGillivray and White, 1993). It is, therefore, important to emphasise the 
scale of differences in life expectancy between countries, and to note trends in cross-
country differences in the size of the gender gap in life expectancy, since this gap is likely 
to have important effects on the quality of future labour supplies.  Similar arguments 
apply to differences in literacy rates across countries and to differences between countries 
in the size of the gender literacy gap, although the data on literacy is generally considered 
to be less robust and comparable than the data on life expectancy.19 
 
                                                 
19 Most of the available data on  is based on reported rather than tested literacy and in some cases are 
derived from other proxy information.  Moreover, definitions are not necessarily standardized. And the field 
experience of the authors of this paper suggests that it is difficult to discern the value of a particular school 
grade across very different education systems. In some countries, attending the first 2-3 years of primary 
school may be sufficient to acquire literacy and numeracy skills, while in other countries or in other 
periods, pupils in higher grades cannot be regarded as literate. Furthermore, in some countries, particularly 
in the Sahel, informal systems of schooling, based on different types of Koranic and Franco-Arab schools, 
are frequently ignored in the official statistics, which may result in underestimation of effective literacy (in 
Arabic). 
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Table 7 provides UN Population Division life expectancy estimates for two 
periods, 2000-2005 and 2010-2015.  In the first period, the range of female life 
expectancy across African countries is huge - from about 30 years to about 60 years - and 
females can expect to live 4- 5 years longer than males in some countries, while in others 
their life expectancy is about the same as that of males. By the second period these 
significant differences between countries are projected to increase.  For example, female 
life expectancy in Ghana will be more than 33 years longer than in Swaziland and female 
life expectancy will have fallen below that of males in several countries.   
These differences between countries may be explained, in part, by the differential 
prevalence and stages of HIV/AIDS (as discussed in Section 2, above), but there are other 
indicators of women's status that also vary dramatically between countries and are not 
closely correlated with national HIV/AIDS statistics.  For example, over half of young 
women were illiterate in Ethiopia, Mauritania, Senegal and Mozambique in 2000, while 
less than 15 percent of young women were illiterate in Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, South 
Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania and Zambia (Table 7).  Some countries already had small or 
no gaps between the illiteracy rates of young females and males in 2000, but others had 
very large gender gaps (of the order of 29 percentage points in 2000) and the gaps will 
still be large (between 10 and 17 percentage points) in Mozambique, Malawi, Senegal 
and Mauritania by 2015.20   
It is safe to predict that the children of illiterate mothers will face relatively high 
risks of undernutrition, morbidity and inadequate schooling; they will enrol later, leave at 
an earlier age, and perform relatively poorly in educational attainment tests (Morrisson, 
2002: 10; Filmer, 2003) and, as a consequence, their labour productivity will be low.  
Thus, the quality of the future supply of labour in six countries where between a quarter 
and half of young women remain illiterate in 2015 is likely to be very inferior to that in 
the other eight countries listed in Table 7. 
                                                 
20 The impact of gender gaps in educational attainment on economic growth and on other variables, 
including male life expectancy, is discussed in King and Hill, 1993: Chapter 3. 
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         Table 7:   Estimated and Projected Life Expectancy at Birth and  
Youth Illiteracy Rates, By Gender 
 Life Expectancy at Birth 
(Medium Variant) 
2000-2005* 
Life Expectancy at Birth 
(Medium Variant) 
2010-2015* 
Illiteracy Rate (%) 
15-24 Years Old** 
2000 
Illiteracy Rate (%) 
15-24 Years Old** 
2015 
 Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male 
Côte d’Ivoire  41.2 40.8 45.8 45.0 48 29 29 20 
Ethiopia   46.3 44.6 48.8 47.5 51 39 30 26 
Ghana   59.3 56.5 62.9 60.5 11 6 3 3 
Kenya  45.6 43.5 44.9 45.0 6 4 1 2 
Lesotho  37.7 32.3 32.3 32.0 1 17 1 13 
Malawi  37.7 37.3 39.1 40.2 39 19 26 13 
Mauritania 54.1 50.9 58.1 54.9 59 43 50 40 
Mozambique  39.6 36.6 39.5 39.1 54 25 32 15 
Senegal 55.1 50.8 59.1 54.8 58 40 39 28 
South Africa  50.7 45.1 40.5 42.3 9 9 6 6 
Swaziland  35.4 33.3 29.6 31.1 9 10 4 5 
Uganda  46.9 45.4 56.2 53.8 28 15 15 9 
Tanzania 44.1 42.5 47.4 45.6 12 7 4 4 
Zambia  32.1 32.7 34.6 35.9 14 9 7 5 
SSA Total 
(35 Countries,  Weighted) 
 
46.7 
 
44.8 
 
48.0 
 
47.3 
    
Eastern Asia 74.7 69.7 76.5 70.4     
South-central Asia 63.9 62.5 66.9 64.9     
*United Nations Population Division (2003); **   http://www.uis.unesco.org (July 2004). 
 
The scale of the difference in predicted outcomes for children born in different 
Sub-Saharan African countries is also reflected in comparative data on child nutrition and 
child survival rates (Table 8). Many studies have demonstrated associations between 
undernutrition and growth retardation, impaired mental development and increased 
susceptibility to infectious diseases. In Sub-Saharan Africa, recent work suggests that 
undernutrition and micronutrient deficiencies are causing large numbers of children to 
suffer from malaria, while Vitamin A deficiency, affecting between 28 and 35 percent of 
children in different parts of Africa, is a major cause of blindness (Caufield et al: 2004).  
In addition, micro-level evidence demonstrates a significant relationship between 
preschooler nutritional status and the number of years of schooling they can complete, as 
well as their labour productivity as adults (Alderman et al, 2003).  Thus, the data on the 
prevalence of undernutrition presented in Table 8 suggest that the quality of the future 
labour force in Ethiopia, where more than half of children under five years old suffer 
from moderate or severe stunting and 16 percent of children are severely underweight, 
will be much lower than the quality of future labour supplies in other Sub-Saharan 
African countries (including Cote D'Ivoire, Ghana, Lesotho, Senegal and South Africa), 
where roughly a quarter or less of children suffer from moderate and severe stunting and 
six percent or less suffer from severe underweight. 
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   The differential risks faced by children are well illustrated in the data on the levels 
and trends in Under-Five Mortality Rates (Table 8). Some countries combine both very 
high levels of Under-Five Mortality and a weak record in reducing this rate over the 
period 1990 to 2002 (Zambia, Mauritania). Others have quite high current rates and a 
disastrous record in terms of reducing Under-Five Mortality Rates (Swaziland, Kenya, 
and Cote d'Ivoire). In contrast, Malawi and Mozambique have achieved large reductions 
in the Under-Five Mortality Rate since 1990, but still have extremely high current rates. 
Ghana, which currently has an Under-five Mortality Rate that is about half of 
Mozambique and Zambia, has been successful in reducing its rate (by 21 percent since 
1990). These results confirm the heterogeneity of Sub-Saharan African countries in terms 
of their current ability to ensure child survival and their recent record in achieving 
improvements in child survival.21 They also provide another clear, policy relevant 
indication of those countries where the quality of the current female labour force is likely 
to be particularly low, since maternal undernutrition and illiteracy are strongly associated 
with high rates of child mortality. 
Table 8: Under-Five Malnutrition, Mortality and Reductions in Mortality Rates 
 
 
 
% of Under-Fives 
(1995-2002) 
Suffering From 
Under-5 
Mortality  
Rate 
(2002) 
  
 Underweight 
(Severe) 
Stunting 
(Moderate 
and Severe) 
 
 
Average Annual  
Rate of Reduction   
1990-2002 (%) 
Reduction Since 
1990 (%) 
Côte d’Ivoire  5 25 176 -1.1 -14 
Ethiopia   16 52 171 1.5 16 
Ghana   5 26 100 1.9 21 
Kenya  6 35 122 -1.9 -26 
Lesotho  3 12 87 2.7 28 
Malawi  6 49 183 2.3 24 
Mauritania 10 35 183 0.0 0 
Mozambique  - 44 197 1.5 16 
Senegal 6 25 138 0.6 7 
South Africa   2 25 65 -0.7 -8 
Swaziland  2 30 149 -2.5 -35 
Uganda  5 39 141 1.1 12 
United Republic of Tanzania  7 44 165 -0.1 -1 
Zambia  7 47 192 -0.1 -2 
Total  (Sub-Saharan Africa, 
 35 Countries, Weighted ) 
8 38 174 0.3 3 
South Asia 
 
17 44 97 2.3 24 
Source: UNICEF, Basic Indicators 2004 ( http://www.unicef.org/sowc04/sowc04_tables.html) 
  
 
                                                 
21 Econometric work on the determinants of the capacity of different Sub-Saharan African countries to 
reduce under-five mortality is noted below in Section 4.3. 
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Sub-Saharan Africa's development experience since 1945 is often unfavourably 
compared with the development performance of certain East Asian and Latin American 
developing economies.  Such comparisons too often ignore the fact that, for example, 80 
percent of adult females were already literate in Chile by the early 1950s, more than 50 
percent were literate in Mexico and the Philippines, and over a third were literate in 
Thailand.  They also ignore the fact that, in 1960, the average level of schooling of the 
working age population was only 1.3 years in Sub-Saharan Africa, compared to 3.8 years 
in Latin America and the Caribbean and 2.3 years in East Asia and Pacific (OECD New 
Database, 2002:12).22 Thus, the starting points for improvements in human development 
and labour productivity were by no means comparable, suggesting that considerable 
caution should be applied before assuming that all Sub-Saharan economies should or 
could have replicated some of the post-war successes of the NICs (Sender, 1999: 92; 
Platteau, 1996).  
3.2 Intra-Country Differentials in Education and Health Status 
 
If appropriate policies are to be developed, it is not sufficient to highlight enduring 
disparities in the growth rates of labour supply and in the quality of labour available in 
different Sub-Saharan economies.  It is also necessary to emphasise the degree of 
differentiation within each of these economies. A focus on inter-country differences may 
avoid the dangers of crude Africa-wide policy prescriptions to improve the quality of 
labour supply. It might also support arguments for reallocating Official Development 
Assistance towards particularly vulnerable countries in Africa, ending the trend bias in 
the 1990s away from the poorest countries (White, 2002: 12).  However, inequalities in 
the intra-country distribution of education, health, sanitation and other services mean that 
the labour supply from some regions, districts or households will continue to exhibit very 
different capacities to work productively.   
There has been a great deal of recent research comparing the relative degree of 
inequality in the health and education of the populations of countries in SSA.  This 
research, based on comparable DHS data, confirms the persistence of substantial variation 
in, e.g., the extent of the urban-rural divide in standards of living.  Thus, although living  
                                                 
22 Although the annual average growth rate of schooling between 1960 and 2000 was slightly faster in SSA 
than in East Asia and Pacific (2.7% vs. 2.6%), average schooling in SSA by 2000 was only 3.9 years, 
compared to 6.4 years in EAP (ibid).  
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standards in rural areas of SSA generally lag far behind those in urban areas, the size of 
the lag is very much greater in some countries than others.  However, focusing on rural 
education/health standards would not be sufficient to reduce national inequalities, since 
most of the inequality in these countries is comprised of inequalities within rural and 
urban areas (Sahn and Stifel, 2004).  
Inequalities in several indicators of human welfare are far greater in rural than in 
urban areas. For example, the Theil index of education inequality, based on attainment 
data (i.e. the ultimate year of schooling for the population of working age23), is much 
higher in the rural than the urban areas of all countries in Table 9.24   
 
Table 9: Inequalities in Educational Attainment 
 
Country:  
(date of DHS) 
Percentage Without Any School 
  
Theil Inequality Measures 
 
 National Rural Urban Gini National Rural Urban 
Cote d'Ivoire 
(1994)  48 57.3 36 0.622 0.777 0.978 0.553 
Ghana 
 (1998)  21.1 26.9 11.1 0.378 0.318 0.397 0.185 
Kenya 
 (1998)  6.3 7 4.3 0.253 0.135 0.142 0.096 
Malawi  
(1992) 33.2 36.6 14.3 0.522 0.537 0.587 0.245 
Mozambique 
(1997)  33.5 40.8 13.5 0.547 0.582 0.686 0.264 
Senegal 
  (1992)  64.3 83.9 38.4 0.796 1.551 2.654 0.871 
Tanzania 
  (1999)  18.2 21.8 8.7 0.305 0.265 0.303 0.163 
Uganda 
 (1995)  22.2 24.8 8.1 0.431 0.37 0.399 0.168 
Zambia 
 (1996) 9.7 15.2 3.1 0.305 0.193 0.259 0.097 
Source: Sahn and Stifel, (2004, 24) 
 
 
Table 9 shows that rural inequality in education attainment is generally high, but 
far greater in some countries than in others.  For example, the rural Theil index for 
Senegal is 2.654, compared to a rural Theil index of 0.142 for Kenya.  Similarly, 
indicators of the health status of rural and urban populations show significant variations 
in the size of rural-urban gaps. Theil indices confirm that rural inequality in health is far 
                                                 
23 Here defined as people 15 to 40 years old.  
24 The Theil measure is used because it is decomposable into groups, i.e. it can be decomposed into the sum 
of within and between region (urban or rural) contributions to inequality, to indicate the degree to which a 
reduction in inequality between rural and urban areas would reduce overall inequality.  This measure is the 
basis for the conclusion that the contribution of inequality within rural regions predominates in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (ibid: 22). 
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worse in some countries than in others (Table 10).25  For example the rural Theil index 
for health inequality is 1.7229 in Kenya and only 1.012 in Tanzania. 
 
Table 10: Rural and Urban Health Inequality 
Country 
 (and DHS Date) 
Gini Theil Measure 
(NCHS Adjusted) 
Rural Theil Measure 
(NCHS Adjusted) 
Urban Theil Measure 
(NCHS Adjusted) 
     
Cote d'Ivoire (1994)  0.034 1.241 1.4337 0.7108 
Ghana (1998) 0.0331 1.0964 1.1325 0.8554 
Kenya (1998)  0.0379 1.759 1.7229 1.6867 
Malawi (1992)  0.0356 1.4337 1.4096 1.2048 
Mozambique (1997)  0.0383 1.8072 1.9036 1.4096 
Senegal (1992)  0.0339 1.2169 1.3373 0.8193 
Tanzania (1999)  0.032 0.9639 1.012 0.4578 
Uganda (1995)  0.0346 1.3735 1.3976 1 
Zambia (1996)  0.0355 1.4217 1.5904 1 
Source: Sahn and Stifel, (2004;, 25) 
 
The data contained in Tables 9 and 10, showing large disparities between 
countries in measures of health and educational status, as well as very different patterns 
and degrees of inequality, derive from research that does not attempt to analyse 
correlations between education/health status and income or other indicators of social 
stratification.  However, the gaps between the health and educational status of poor and 
better-off households in Sub-Saharan Africa are very substantial and the asset/expenditure 
levels of African households do appear to be a good, if not perfect, predictor of the health 
and educational status of household members (Houweling et al., 2003; Gwatkin and 
Rutstein, 2000; Filmer and Pritchett, 2001). The evidence (see Table A4) indicates an 
almost complete lack of basic educational opportunities for poor girls in Ethiopia, 
Senegal, Mozambique and Cote D’Ivoire.  Poor girls are significantly more likely achieve 
a basic education in Ghana, Malawi, Zambia and Tanzania, but only Kenya and South 
Africa have achieved nearly universal grade four attainment for both girls and boys 
(Figure 3). One clear implication is that the prospects for the supply of educated and 
productive labour, including the domestic labour of women who have the capacity to 
improve the nutritional status of their children, differ a great deal between different types 
of households in each Sub-Saharan African economy. 
                                                 
25 Sahn and Stifel measure inequality in health by the inequality in linear growth of children, since they 
argue that child height is a useful indicator of well-being.  They assess the degree to which inequality of 
heights in the DHS samples, conditional on gender and age, differs from the inequality observed in the 
National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) healthy reference population (2004:13).  
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Figure 3 
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The case for a policy focus on improving the quality of labour supplied by the 
poorest rural households is reinforced when the growing problem of orphaned children 
(highlighted in 2.4 above) is considered.  This is because orphaned children, on average, 
live in poorer households than non-orphans (and are more likely to live in households 
headed by females or less educated men).  Although the low levels of education achieved 
by orphans is not solely due to their relative poverty (Case et al, 2002, 3; 22; 29-30), 
research based on longitudinal survey results stresses that parental deaths have very 
different impacts across socio-economic groups (Evans and Miguel, 2004: 18).  It is clear 
that orphans living in poor households are likely to receive significantly less education 
than other children.  Therefore, when these children do enter the labour market, their lack 
of basic literacy and numeracy is likely to confine them within poorly remunerated 
segments of the market. At present, about 90 percent of orphans are of school going age 
and there is a strong case for urgent policy initiatives aimed at keeping all orphans, but 
particularly those living in the poorest households, at school. Policy interventions in 
Botswana, including the provision of meals at school, seem to have had a significant 
impact on school absenteeism rates for orphans, which are much lower than in Malawi 
and Uganda (United Nations, 2004c: 72). 
Another category of children, apart from those whose parent(s) have died, are also 
likely to complete few years of schooling and to enter poorly remunerated forms of 
employment. These are the children of women who become pregnant as teenagers, who 
are at risk partly because their mothers will have had so little success in the labour market 
(Sender, 2002; Sender et al, 2004).  Table 11 shows that both teenage pregnancy and 
child stunting are much more likely to occur in the poorest quintile of households than in 
the richest, in all of the selected Sub-Saharan countries for which data are available.  This 
Table also indicates that the labour productivity of women aged 15 to 49 years in the 
poorest quintile is likely to be much lower than that of women in the richest quintile; 
partly they are more likely to be malnourished, i.e. to have a Body Mass Index of less 
than 18.5.  There is also evidence to suggest that high total fertility rates have adverse 
consequences for women's labour market performance, limiting women's mobility in 
labour markets, the total number of years of work experience they can gain and, therefore, 
their wages (Sender, 2003:37; Joshi et al, 1999:556). Table 14 shows that, in some 
countries, women in the poorest quintile of households have total fertility rates well over 
twice as high as those of women in the richest quintile. The poorest women are also likely 
 36
to run higher risks of neo-natal mortality: they are far less likely than women in richer 
households to get adequate antenatal care or have births attended by medically trained 
personnel (Table 12). It has been suggested that African children whose mothers received 
antenatal care are generally healthier (taller) and do better at school (Morrisson, 2002: 9).  
 
Table 11: Selected Indicators of Fertility and Health for Women and Children 
in the Richest and Poorest Households 
Country Percentage of 
Women 
 Aged 15-19  
Giving Birth 
 in One Year 
Percentage of 
Children 
Moderately and 
Severely 
 Stunted 
Percentage of  
Malnourished 
Women 
Total Fertility Rate 
(Lifetime Births 
per Women) 
 Poorest 
 Fifth 
Richest 
 Fifth 
Poorest 
 Fifth 
Richest 
 Fifth 
Poorest 
 Fifth 
Richest 
Fifth 
Poorest 
 Fifth 
Richest 
Fifth 
Cote D'Ivoire 19 7 34 13 11 6 6.4 3.7 
Ethiopia 8 7 53 43 32 25 6.3 3.6 
Ghana 13 2 35 10 18 5 6.3 2.4 
Kenya 16 6 44 17 18 6 6.5 3.0 
Malawi 19 14 58 34 10 6 7.1 4.8 
Mauritania 9 5 39 23 17 9 5.4 3.5 
Mozambique 19 13 48 22 17 4 5.2 4.4 
Senegal 15 4 .. .. .. .. 7.4 3.6 
South Africa 11 2 .. .. .. .. 4.8 1.9 
Tanzania 20 8 50 23 12** 7** 7.8 3.4 
Uganda 23 11 43 25 15 5 8.5 4.1 
Zambia 19 9 54 32 9 4 7.3 3.6 
Source: Population Reference Bureau, 2004:2. 
**1995-7 DHS (other Tanzanian data from 1999). 
 
 
Table 12:  Ante- and Neo-Natal Health Care in the Poorest and Richest 
Households 
Country Percentage of Women with 3+ 
Antenatal Care Visits 
Percentage of Births Attended by 
Medically Trained Personnel 
 Poorest 
 Fifth 
Richest 
 Fifth 
Poorest 
 Fifth 
Richest 
 Fifth 
Cote D'Ivoire 26 75 17 84 
Ethiopia 7 45 1 25 
Ghana 59 91 18 86 
Kenya 77 87 23 80 
Malawi 77 86 43 83 
Mauritania 16 75 15 93 
Mozambique 30 75 18 82 
Senegal 44 84 20 86 
South Africa 78 90 68 98 
Tanzania 82 93 29 83 
Uganda 59 86 20 77 
Zambia 80 92 20 91 
Source: Population Reference Bureau, 2004:2. 
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3.3 Summary and Conclusions 
 
Underpinning the prospects for future development of the quality of the labour 
supply in Sub-Saharan Africa are extraordinary inequalities in the health, education and 
life expectancy of populations in the region. These inequalities have direct implications 
for policy priorities. This section has stressed the scale of differences in life expectancy 
between countries as well as cross-country differences in the degree of a gender gap in 
life expectancy. Furthermore, the range of female life expectancies between countries, 
already striking, is projected to increase so that, e.g., female life expectancy in Ghana is 
likely to be some 33 years longer than in Swaziland by 2015.  
The differential impact of HIV/AIDS obviously partly accounts for this trend but 
other factors also help to explain it. Thus, there are substantial variations in literacy levels 
and in literacy gender gaps between countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Female illiteracy, 
which is particularly significant in countries like Ethiopia, Mauritania, Senegal and 
Mozambique and which also lags behind male literacy in these countries, is an important 
constraint on the quality of the future labour supply, given the association of illiteracy 
with high risks of child undernutrition, morbidity, and inadequate schooling. Levels of 
undernutrition, affecting health, schooling, and later productivity, also vary across 
countries. In Ethiopia, more than half of children under five years old suffer from 
moderate or severe stunting, compared to a quarter or less of children in this age group in 
countries like Ghana, Senegal and South Africa. Similarly, not only are there different 
levels of under-five mortality in different SSA countries, but also some countries have 
sharply reduced this level in recent years while others have experienced increases in 
under-five mortality rates.  
These trends suggest very strongly the need to avoid Africa-wide policy 
prescriptions and to reallocate aid flows towards especially vulnerable countries. 
However, policy design also has to address the substantial inequalities within countries in 
the distribution of education, health and other services. The degree of inequality in 
education attainment, for example, is much higher within rural than urban areas of all 
countries in our sample. This rural education inequality is also much sharper in some 
countries – e.g. Senegal – than in others. There is an almost complete lack of education 
opportunities for poor girls in countries like Ethiopia, Senegal, Mozambique, and Cote 
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d’Ivoire, though in some countries poorer girls are more likely to get a basic education. 
Much the same is true of the distribution of health services. 
There is thus a strong case for prioritising resource allocations towards tackling 
the health and education provision for the poorest rural people. There is also an urgent 
need to implement policy initiatives to keep children and orphans, especially those living 
in poorer households, in school. Meanwhile, evidence of the poor health and education 
status of children of women who become pregnant as teenagers suggests another focus for 
policy initiatives, to overcome inter-generational traps of poverty and low productivity.  
A further implication of the trends highlighted in this section is that effective 
policy design for improving the prospects of labour supply quality will require more 
focused empirical research, based on purposive sampling of the poorest quintile of the 
population. This point is taken up in Section 6.2, below. 
4. Improving the Quality of Labour Supply: Constraints and Policy 
Opportunities 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The quality of labour supplied in each Sub-Saharan African economy will be 
influenced by the capacity to educate and to improve the health and skills of the next 
generation of workers. This Section will discuss these three aspects of labour quality, 
beginning with a discussion of capacity constraints in the education sector. However, it is 
important first to emphasise the shortcomings of the available data on schooling. Net 
enrolment rates are seldom available, precisely because school dropout and repetition 
rates are inaccurately recorded in many Sub-Saharan Africa countries (OECD New 
Human Capital Database, 2002; Behrman and Rosenzweig, 1994). If estimates of 
schooling are not adequate to characterise the quality of the labour force, alternative 
indicators are also difficult to come by. Reliable and disaggregated information on years 
of labour experience, probably an extremely important dimension of labour force quality, 
are rarely available. Data on training in the workplace are often missing in the available 
datasets. Firm and establishment surveys,  
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almost the only data sources for this information (Recanatini et al, 2002), contain rather 
weak modules on employment and the quality of the labour force.26  
The quality of African labour in the future will also depend on how the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic affects the skill composition of the labour force. There is some evidence that 
HIV/AIDS prevalence rates differ substantially across skill groups in the labour force and 
that the epidemic will have a differential impact on labour force growth by skill category.  
For example, in Southern Africa there appears to be an inverse relationship between HIV 
prevalence and skill class, with unskilled and semi-skilled workers having a much higher 
prevalence than their skilled, highly skilled or managerial counterparts.27  Tracer studies 
comparing the mortality of university with secondary school leavers in Uganda, Tanzania, 
Malawi and Zimbabwe in the 1990s find that a very much higher percentage of the less 
educated secondary school graduates had died, many of them, presumably, from AIDS-
related illness (Al-Samarrai and Bennell, 2003: 27). Given the current skill composition 
of the labour force, projected labour supply losses at lower skill levels far exceed losses at 
higher skill levels, although the epidemic is also anticipated to exacerbate skills shortages 
in the region.   
However, the empirical basis for these projections remains extremely weak 
(Bennell, 2003).  For example, the available estimates of HIV prevalence across 
industries do not provide reliable estimates of prevalence in the economy, since the 
samples are not representative of the industries or sectors concerned and, besides, 
estimates vary dramatically, even for the same types of companies in the same sectors.  
Prevalence estimates for mining companies in South Africa range from 5.5 percent to 
29.5 percent and, for non-mining companies, from 0.2 percent to 21.5 percent (Booysen 
et al, 2003: 12). When public or private sector organisations in South Africa do provide 
data on HIV prevalence rates amongst their employees, they “limit information to 
aggregate HIV/Aids prevalence rates with little or no information about the demographic, 
skills and occupational distribution of HIV/AIDS” (Vass, 2002: 6).    
It is not possible to relate any national prevalence data to important socio-
economic status indicators, including indicators of employment status, job categories, 
sectors of employment, levels of education, training and work experience (Booysen et al 
                                                 
26 The ILO’s Enterprise Labour Flexibility and Security Survey instrument is an exception, but has only 
been applied in surveys in two African economies - South Africa and Tanzania (ILO, 2004c). 
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2003:11).  In part, this difficulty arises because of a more general problem with labour 
force surveys that only collect limited information on the work performed by the 
population of working age throughout the year, before lumping them into pre-determined, 
crudely dichotomous categories and sectors, i.e. economically (in)active, (un)employed, 
(in)formal,  primary and secondary employment, etc. (see Section 6.1 below). However, it 
is not possible to relate even these flawed labour force data to national statistics on HIV 
prevalence.   
The problem is exacerbated because DHS questionnaires fail to collect sufficient 
information on the types of work done by sero-positive and negative household members 
in different socio-economic strata. As a result the precise impact of HIV/AIDS on the 
quality of the labour force, especially on those working in the very large, unenumerated 
sector in African economies, is poorly understood.  
 
4.2 Teachers and Conditional Cash Transfers for Schooling 
 
The education required by new entrants to the labour force, according to potential 
employers, is the basic literacy and numeracy essential for rapidly acquiring the skills to 
do their jobs (Godfrey, 2003: 13).  The capacity to provide such education in schools will 
depend, in part, on the local severity of the HIV/AIDS epidemic.  However, it also 
depends on the policies implemented by individual countries, including the history and 
pattern of their investment in education and health since 1945, as well as upon the 
outcome of investment efforts in more recent decades, reflected in Tables 7-12.  
Obviously, past policies and current capacity vary widely between countries. 
In most Sub-Saharan countries, the school age population is projected to continue 
to grow up to 2010 despite the effects of the HIV/AIDS epidemic (United Nations, 2004c: 
Chapter VI).  The quantitative output of schools in most countries depends, therefore, on 
enrolment and completion rates, which may be affected by several factors, including the 
available supply of teachers.  If HIV/AIDS results in the death, illness and absenteeism of 
increasing numbers of teachers, (and reduces the effective numbers of education sector 
administrators, planning and finance officials, etc.), then the quality of schools’ output 
will also be affected. However, there is no reliable evidence to suggest that prevalence is  
                                                                                                                                                  
27 Not all surveys confirm this relationship: e.g. in a Zambian survey prevalence amongst skilled workers 
was 26 percent, compared to 18 percent for unskilled/contract workers (ILO, 2004a: 17). 
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particularly high amongst school teachers, although it does appear to be significantly 
higher among primary school teachers than among teachers in secondary schools 
(Bennell, 2003b: 16). 
In fact, there is little comparable cross-country evidence on reductions in teacher 
supply attributable to HIV/AIDS mortality and morbidity.  A Zambian study suggested 
that the number of teacher deaths in 1998 was equivalent to the loss of about two thirds of 
the annual output of newly trained teachers.  In Malawi, about 10 percent of education 
personnel in urban areas were estimated to have died of AIDS by 1997, and it was 
projected that this figure would rise to 40 percent by 2005.  In KwaZulu-Natal, an area 
with even higher prevalence rates, mortality among teachers increased very rapidly 
between 1997 and 2001 in a sample covering 100 schools (United Nations, 2004c: 71).  
In this Province, it has been estimated that, out of the current cohort of 75,000, no less 
than 65,000 teachers will have been lost by 2010, as a result of emigration, natural (non-
AIDS) attrition and AIDS mortality (Whiteside, 2003: 27). However, it has also been 
argued that the trend in teacher mortality is downwards and not upwards in a number of 
countries, including Botswana, Uganda and Zambia and that, "projected morbidity and 
absenteeism rates for teachers are little more than inspired guesses" (Bennell, 2003b:8).28 
The ability to maintain or expand the supply of teachers in rural areas will depend, 
in part, on teacher training capacity. It may be assumed that the underlying capacity to 
expand the supply of skilled personnel to the education sector (and to other key sectors, 
including health and technical skills provision) is limited in those countries that have 
relatively low numbers of students enrolled in the tertiary sector.  Table 13 provides some 
information on the numbers enrolled in the Tertiary Sector.  Tertiary enrolment, as a 
percentage of the relevant age group, is especially low in Tanzania, Mozambique, Malawi 
and Ethiopia.   
 
 
                                                 
28 Similar uncertainties affect published estimates of the mortality and morbidity of skilled health sector 
workers. 
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Table 13:  Tertiary Enrolment and Gross Enrolment Ratios, 
(Most Recent Data) 
 
 
Total Tertiary Enrolment 
(Thousands, Latest Available 
Year) 
Gross Enrolment in Tertiary 
Education as Percentage of 
the Age Group 
Cote d'Ivoire 55 (1994) 4.5 
Ethiopia 32.7 (1994) 0.7 
Ghana 19 (1990) 1.4 
Kenya 33.5 (1990) 1.6 
Lesotho 4.6 (1996) 2.4 
Malawi 5.6 (1995) 0.6 
Mauritania 8.5 (1995) 3.9 
Mozambique 7.1 (1996) 0.5 
Senegal 24.1 (1994) 3.4 
South Africa 690 (1995) 15.9 
Swaziland 5.7 (1996) 6.0 
Tanzania 12.28 (1995) 0.5 
Uganda 34.8 (1996) 1.7 
Zambia 19 (1994) 2.4 
Sub-Saharan Africa           2,017 (1996)  
Source: Association for the Development of Education in Africa, 2004: http://www.adeanet.org 
 
 
However, the annual average rate of growth of tertiary enrolments, where the data 
allow this to be calculated, appears to have been rather rapid in several Sub-Saharan 
African countries, including those countries starting from a very low capacity base: e.g., 
16.9 percent in Tanzania, 12.5 percent in Mozambique and nearly 10 percent in Ethiopia 
in the years after 1993; and over an earlier period (1985-1990) 11.3 percent in Malawi 
(http://www.adeanet.org).  In Zambia, teacher-training capacity was increased 
dramatically from less than 2,000 to nearly 6,000 in the late 1990s (Bennell, 2003b: 38). 
These growth rates suggest that there is scope for policy interventions to achieve quite 
rapid responses to inadequate capacity, or to AIDS-related declines in the numbers of 
teachers and other key personnel with post-secondary education.   
Other policy interventions may be effective in improving the poorest children’s 
access to education, or reducing the impact of declines in teacher numbers due to 
HIV/AIDS. Rural schools typically have high levels of staff turnover and attrition, as well 
as high pupil: teacher ratios, for reasons that have little to do with HIV/AIDS. On 
aggregate, teacher supplies may be quite high at the national level, but the distribution of 
teachers to particular types of school can be influenced by promotion structures, salaries 
and other incentives. More important, the ability of the poorest rural children to complete 
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primary schooling has been shown to be determined less by supply side factors than by 
the demand side, especially the socio-economic characteristics of the households in which 
these children live.  In Mozambique, for example, "Policy simulations comparing the 
impact of different policy interventions on rural primary school enrolment rates reveal 
that changes in demand-side (for example, household characteristics) dominate supply-
side factors in their impact on children’s schooling" (Handa et al, 2004: xi).   
The most cost-effective policy intervention in these simulations was to invest in 
female adult literacy campaigns in rural areas, since having a literate mother greatly 
increases the probability that a poor rural child will attend school.  However, household 
incomes also influence children's educational attainment and it should be possible to 
replicate the success of policies in other developing countries that provide a monthly 
income payment to mothers on condition that their children go to school.  The relevant 
policies include the Bolsa Escola in Brazil, PROGRESA (recently renamed 
Oportunidades) in Mexico, and others in Bangladesh, Columbia, Nicaragua, Honduras 
and Jamaica (ILO, 2004d: 382-4).  The relevance of policies targeting such conditional 
transfers on the poorest African rural women has recently been accepted by the World 
Bank, which also now recognizes the scope to improve the educational attainment of the 
poorest rural labour market entrants through much greater efforts to eliminate user fees in 
primary education.  These fees are still widespread in Sub-Saharan Africa (Kattan and 
Burnett, 2004).29 
The most systematic review of the evidence suggests that the impact of HIV/AIDS 
on schooling in Sub-Saharan Africa need not be catastrophic, pointing to the example of 
Uganda, a high prevalence country, which was able to introduce universal primary 
education and where secondary enrolments have increased very rapidly since the late 
1990s (Bennell 2003b: 46). There is also other recent evidence of rapid change in the 
provision of schooling. For example, in Malawi, there has been a pronounced pro-poor 
shift in the benefit incidence of public spending on education. The share of benefits from 
primary spending accruing to the poorest quintile increased from 15 percent in the early 
                                                 
29 “Poverty targeting measures are required when …the difference in access to services between poor and nonpoor is 
wide. Subsidizing education, waiving the uniform obligation, and supporting the health and nutrition needs of the 
poorest children would contribute to an improvement in the welfare of the neediest [Orphans and Vulnerable Children]. 
In such circumstances, conditional cash transfer programs, with a significant element of self-targeting as appropriate, 
appear promising…” (Subbarao and Coury, 2004: 98). 
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1990s to 25 percent in the late 1990s.  A similar pro-poor shift occurred at the secondary 
education level (Davoodi et al., 2003:26).   
 
4.3 Health Workers  
 
Recent cross-country research suggests that there is a positive relationship 
between health worker density and health outcomes as measured by under-five mortality, 
(which is a reasonable proxy for labour quality and productivity).  The total number of 
physicians, nurses and midwives per population has a positive effect on mortality rates 
over and above the effects of income, education and poverty levels (Anand and 
Baernighausen, 2004), suggesting that efforts to increase the number of health workers 
could make a significant contribution to the health status and the quality of labour in the 
low health worker density countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, the total number of 
health professionals in Sub-Saharan Africa is very low in comparison to other developing 
regions of the world – estimated at only about 600,000, which translates into a density of 
about 1 health worker per 1000 people – (Joint Learning Initiative, 2004: 29). 
Table 14 shows the huge gaps between the health worker densities across SSA. Ethiopia 
and Uganda have densities below 0.25, and Malawi and Mozambique also score badly 
(0.31). In contrast, densities are very much higher in Kenya (1.03), Ghana (0.93) and 
those economies where densities are well over 1.0 and health expenditures per capita are 
also very much higher. Donor expenditures have by no means begun to redress these 
imbalances (Joint Learning Initiative, 2004: Table A2.4). In addition, they have been 
uncoordinated. Typically, each donor project has its own different priorities and there are 
overlapping health staff training and incentive sub-systems, which usually operate outside 
government health systems and have undermined staffing in state structures and systems 
(USAID, 2003: 36; Pfeiffer, 2003).  
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Table 14:   Distribution of Health Personnel in Sub-Saharan Africa, (2003 or 
Most Recent Available Data) 
 
Human Resources for 
Health Index1 
 
Density of Physicians 
(per ‘000 Population) 
Density of Nurses and 
Midwives 
(per ‘000 Population) 
Cote d'Ivoire 0.55 0.09 0.46 
Ethiopia 0.23 0.03 0.21 
Ghana 0.93 0.09 0.84 
Kenya 1.03 0.13 0.90 
Lesotho 1.12 0.05 1.07 
Malawi 0.31 0.05 0.26 
Mauritania 0.86 0.14 0.72 
Mozambique 0.31 0.02 0.28 
Senegal 0.36 0.08 0.29 
South Africa 4.57 0.69 3.88 
Swaziland 3.38 0.18 3.20 
Tanzania 0.39 0.02 0.37 
Uganda 0.14 0.05 0.05 
Zambia 1.20 0.07 1.13 
Source: Joint Learning Initiative, 2004: Table A2.1 
 
1.  A measure of health worker density based on the total number of doctors, nurses and midwives per 
thousand population 
 
Data on the impact of HIV/AIDS on the supply of health workers is patchy.  
Nevertheless, it has apocalyptically been claimed that, “An entire generation of health 
workers is being lost in the epidemic countries of East and southern Africa” (USAID, 
2003), although it is clear that there are many other causes, apart from premature deaths, 
for the scarcity of health workers relative to population needs. Above all the high 
concentration of health workers in urban and curative facilities, rather than rural and 
preventative services, remains the norm in SSA, as does expenditure on clinical training 
as opposed to more relevant public-health training.   
Most of the disease burden affecting the quality of labour in Sub-Saharan Africa is 
accounted for by communicable disease and could effectively be addressed by 
community nurses.  Besides, there is general agreement that it will not be feasible, within 
the next decade, for Africa to achieve a very substantial increase in the number of doctors 
and professional nurses.  Therefore, it is recommended that, “A more appropriate strategy 
would focus on building up cadres of briefly trained and well-supported auxiliary workers 
who can perform core basic functions” (Joint Learning Initiative, 2004: 73). Yet the 
emphasis in Africa continues to be on the training of degree-level or registered nurses 
(RN), as opposed to community health or enrolled nurses (EN), despite the fact that the 
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professional nurse training programme typically costs 30 percent more than the EN 
programme and takes up to twice as long (USAID, 2003: 8). One consequence of 
expenditures on inappropriate and internationally transferable skills is the large-scale 
emigration of health professionals (see Section 5.3, below).30  More generally, the lack of 
relevance for the poor of the current pattern of health expenditure in Sub-Saharan Africa 
is highlighted by the finding that only 13 percent of the benefits of public expenditures on 
health accrue to the poorest quintile of households, as opposed to an average of almost 29 
percent to the richest quintile.  Even expenditures on Primary Health Care are poorly 
targeted, benefiting the richest households in Sub-Saharan Africa far more than the 
poorest (Table 15). 
 
Table 15:   Benefit Incidence of Public Spending on Health in the 1990s 
(Unweighted average; in percent of total spending) 
 All1  Primary 
Health 
Care2 
 Health 
Centres 
 Hospitals  
 Poorest Richest Poorest Richest Poorest Richest Poorest Richest
Sub-Saharan Africa  12.9 28.6 15.3 22.7 14.5 23.7 12.2 30.9 
Western Hemisphere 23.1 15.2 20.4 19.1 19.1 19.9 17.0 22.2 
 
Source: Davoodi et al, 2003: 25 
1. Includes more than hospitals and health centers. 
2. Refers to one of the following categories: health centers, clinics, child health, and preventive care. 
 
Thus, a focus on meeting the basic health needs of the poorest members of the 
rural labour force would require a major shift in the pattern of both donor and government 
expenditures on health.  Such a shift is unlikely to occur in contexts where the bargaining 
power or “voice” of poorer workers remains weak, relative to the ability of an elite of 
health professionals and their relatively rich urban patients to insist on continued state 
subsidies for high cost facilities. 
4.4  Vocational Education, Training and Skills 
 
There is general agreement in the literature that the existing provision of technical 
and vocational education and training (TVET), including training provided by employers 
in the private sector, by NGOs and by the state, does not benefit the poorest members of 
the labour force.  The irrelevance of existing provision for poor rural women and youth is 
                                                 
30 For example, out of the more than 600 doctors trained in Zambia since independence, only 50 remain 
(ibid: 11).   
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particularly striking (Johanson and Adams, 2004: 178-9; Bennell, 1999: 6,19; Haan, 
2002: 79-81). One review notes that, “the failure of … training institutions to reorient 
their activities in favour of the poor is part of a wider political problem. In particular, pro-
poor training reforms will invariably threaten powerful vested interests” (Bennell, 1999: 
41).   
This political problem has similarities with the problems (discussed in the 
previous Sub-Section) faced by attempts to re-orientate the training of health 
professionals. The relative bargaining power of the vast majority of young, disadvantaged 
labour market entrants who live in rural areas is weak.  These young people are often 
scattered and dispersed across vast swathes of countryside.  They face high transportation 
costs and these, in turn, make it costly to construct and equip a sufficient number of 
primary schools and to recruit and retain teachers in rural areas.  In contrast, the teenagers 
and young adults living in urban areas constitute a rather powerful and vocal part of the 
population and, in many Sub-Saharan African countries, appear to have a relatively 
significant impact on political processes.  Governments have reason to fear riots by 
secondary school students in the largest cities.  These structural features may be used to 
understand the political economy of the relatively high degree of bias towards 
expenditures on students in the upper levels of secondary schools and in tertiary 
education, as well as training systems that are biased so that, “The principal beneficiaries 
are urban males from relatively well off background who attend training institutions in 
order to acquire qualifications that give them access to high paying … jobs in the formal 
sector” (ibid:19). 
Thus, although several African governments are devoting quite a large proportion 
of their budgets to various types of education, they have few resources available to 
improve quality and expand the rural primary school system, because over half of total 
expenditures are allocated to secondary and tertiary education (Berthélemy, 2004: 24).  
The immediate beneficiaries of these expenditures are the children of the wealthiest and 
best educated parents in Africa, as has been shown in research on the socio-economic 
background of recent university and secondary school graduates in Uganda, Tanzania, 
Malawi and Zimbabwe (Al-Samarrai and Bennell, 2003: 22-23).31 
                                                 
31 Both secondary school and university graduates in these surveys appear to spend a considerable 
proportion the time since graduating unemployed and looking for work (ibid: 61).  
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One rationale for devoting both government and donor resources to politically 
vocal young labour market entrants is the belief that there is a growing crisis of 
unemployment in Sub-Saharan Africa, exacerbated by the lack of appropriate skills 
amongst the young.  Thus, well-publicized efforts have been made to estimate the 
statistics for youth “unemployment” and these are reflected in the Millennium 
Development Goals.  However, these estimates effectively ignore the labour market 
problems of the very large number of disadvantaged young people in rural Sub-Saharan 
Africa who simply cannot afford to be “unemployed” in the standard, internationally 
comparable ILO definition of open unemployment.32 There is an emerging, if belated, 
consensus that “unemployment” is only one indicator of labour market outcomes for 
youth and that, in all economies with very large agricultural, unenumerated or “informal” 
sectors, it is usually not the best, or even a particularly useful indicator (Betcherman et al, 
2004: 34).   
Thus, some published data on unemployment in Sub-Saharan Africa make little 
sense.  For example, ILO data suggest that "unemployment" rates in 2003 were no less 
than five times higher in Southern than in Western Africa (Table A12), but this surely 
indicates differences in statistical coverage, survey methods and definitions rather than 
real differences in labour market performance and outcomes. Of course, some young 
people in Sub-Saharan Africa are “unemployed” in terms of this standard definition, but 
they tend to be concentrated in urban areas, to have completed at least some secondary 
schooling, to have educated parents and to live in wealthier households (Standing et al, 
1996; Godfrey, 2003: 5; Collier and Lal, 1986).   
Unemployment of this kind is typically transitional, depending on the size of the 
cohort leaving the higher levels of the education system, the average length of time taken 
to find a job and lags in changes in expectations about appropriate types of job. Godfrey 
concludes that “the proportion of the disadvantaged young who are unemployed will vary 
from country to country and in many will be quite small” (2003: 8). The ILO also 
recognizes that,  
“In several developing countries, young people of higher socio-economic backgrounds 
are over-represented in the unemployment numbers because it is only they who can afford to 
spend time looking for work, without incoming wages” (ILO, 2004b: 8).  
                                                 
32 The poorest young people are, of course, “too busy working to have time to enrol on training courses of any kind” 
(Bennell, 1999: 19). 
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Another rationale for current training efforts, particularly the new concentration in 
the 1990s on training for the informal sector (Johanson, 2002), is the belief that the rate of 
growth of employment opportunities, especially self-employment opportunities, in this 
sector is constrained by the lack of entrepreneurial and other skills. It is believed that 
appropriate training would enable new entrants to this sector to escape from poverty and 
that it can best be supplied by non-public delivery systems.33 Yet there is little evidence 
demonstrating that TVET succeeds in upgrading the necessary skills for successful 
entrepreneurship, or even for adequate survival, on the basis of self-employment in this 
demand-constrained and saturated sector (Barasa and Kaabwe, 2001; Johanson and 
Adams, 2004:51; Haan, 2002: 80).34  There is also insufficient evidence to support the 
view that there are real opportunities for the poorest, least visible rural labour market 
entrants to escape from poverty through self-employment.   
There has been far too little detailed research on the specific labour market 
characteristics of the disadvantaged youth, or the poorest young labour market entrants, to 
establish their geographic and sectoral concentrations and how many of these young men 
and women are: 
1. badly paid wage earners in casual or seasonal jobs; 
2. apparently self-employed traders, construction workers etc, but in reality working 
on commission or  for low daily wages; 
3. engaged in poorly remunerated, distress forms of self-employment; 
4. unpaid workers in family operated enterprises with little potential to increase 
labour productivity; 
5. engaged in caring for the children they have had as teenagers, or for the children 
of other family members; 
6. engaged in viable and potentially expanding, or at least sustainable, forms of self-
employment or family enterprise, but constrained by lack of access to training (and/or 
micro-credit). 
It is not adequate simply to assume that a high proportion of the population aged 
15-24 years who are not currently attending schools can be classified as falling into 
                                                 
33 The enthusiastic donor support for non-government training persists despite the fact that, “reliable information on the 
scope and performance of non-government training is difficult to find in most countries ” (Johanson and Adams 2004: 
6). 
34 In fact, “very little is actually known about the fate of the training graduates and thus of the usefulness of the skills 
imparted. In other words, the training courses are not based on pre-training skills needs assessments; nor is the post-
training impact tracked through tracer studies. (Haan, 2002: 81). 
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category 6, still less that they can be classified as "unemployed".  Yet, in the absence of 
up-to-date and reliable surveys of the labour force employed outside the small registered 
or enumerated, "formal" sector, these assumptions are often made.35  It would probably be 
more realistic to develop policy on the assumption that poverty-reducing growth has 
always been associated with declines in the proportion of the labour force in self-
employment and that, despite the plethora of efforts to increase the viability of the micro-
enterprises operated by self-employed women and men in Sub-Saharan Africa, it is 
unlikely that the region will prove to be an exception. The poorest Africans are unlikely 
to escape from poverty unless more vigorous demand is created for the types of wage 
labour that they can supply. A brief discussion of the appropriate demand-expanding 
policies is provided in Section 6.3 below.  In addition, it will be argued that there is an 
urgent need to devote training resources to increasing the capacity of the most vulnerable 
members of the wage labour force to organise and to acquire the literacy and numeracy 
necessary to defend their interests against the least scrupulous and brutal employers 
(Section 6.4 below). 
For the historical and comparative evidence suggests that an increasingly 
organised wage labour force might develop the capacity to negotiate with employers in 
larger–scale enterprises not only to implement health and safety regulations more 
effectively, but also to improve workplace training that directly improves labour 
productivity. In SSA at present, few employers provide well-designed training. For 
example, a recent survey of 177 firms in Mozambique found that less than one fifth had 
certified in-firm training programmes. About 70 percent of firms relied on informal 
workplace based training, commonly the “sitting with Nellie” model, whereby a new 
worker is placed alongside a more experienced colleague, in order to gain practical 
exposure and “training” in the range of tasks to be performed  (Webster et al, 2004: 16). 
Efforts in the 1990s to promote partnerships between governments and employers to 
improve vocational training have not been very successful (Atchoarena and Delluc, 
2001:18; Johanson and Adams, 2004: 26; Standing et al, 1996). 
                                                 
35 Similar assumptions are common concerning the employment status of prime aged women in rural Sub-
Saharan Africa, with equally little justification (Sender, 2003). 
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4.5 Summary and Conclusions 
The capacity to educate and to improve the health and skills of the next generation 
of African labour supply, particularly targeting the poorest sources of this labour supply, 
must be a central focus of labour market policy. This section has shown how difficult it is 
to define policy priorities in individual countries appropriately given the shortcomings of 
data, for example, on schooling. A key constraint on prospects for raising the quality of 
labour supplies in Sub-Saharan Africa remains the HIV/AIDS epidemic. However, here 
too the empirical gaps frustrate the design of effective policy: despite some evidence of 
differential sero-prevalence rates across skill groups in the labour force, there is really 
extremely little reliable evidence to provide a basis for understanding, and responding to, 
relations between HIV/AIDS infection and socio-economic variables.  
The same empirical uncertainty clouds the assessment of the impact of HIV/AIDS 
on the capacity of the teaching profession to provide the basic literacy and numeracy that 
potential employers seek in employees. There are conflicting estimates of this impact, and 
of recent trends in teacher morbidity and mortality. The achievement of universal primary 
education in Uganda and a pronounced pro-poor shift in the benefit incidence of public 
spending on education in Malawi show, however, that HIV/AIDS need not be an entirely 
crippling constraint on educational prospects. Beyond HIV/AIDS, teaching capacity 
depends on the scale of teacher training. And in some countries – e.g. Tanzania, 
Mozambique, Malawi, and Ethiopia – tertiary enrolment is especially low, which restricts 
the pool of potential teachers. Nonetheless, some evidence of quite rapid recent increases 
in tertiary education enrolments suggests that policies may be effective in accelerating the 
build up of teaching capacity. Schooling, particularly in poor rural areas, is weakened by 
high staff turnover and high pupil: teacher ratios, thanks to incentive structures. These too 
should be susceptible to policy reform – e.g. of salaries and promotion structures. Raising 
the quality of future labour supplies will also depend heavily on policies that strengthen 
demand for schooling, again especially in poor rural areas. These policies should include 
cash transfers to mothers conditional on their children’s school attendance, as well as 
accelerating the eradication of user fees and the abolition of uniforms in primary 
education.   
Similarly, it is important to increase the density of health workers in the 
population and to improve the provision of health facilities in disadvantaged areas. In the 
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light of evidence of the positive effect of the number of physicians, nurses and midwives 
per population on mortality rates, the number of health professionals in Sub-Saharan 
Africa is very low. The health worker density varies between African countries and 
donors need to help to address this in countries where the density is particularly low, as in 
Ethiopia, Uganda, Malawi and Mozambique. Furthermore, health workers throughout the 
region remain excessively concentrated in urban areas and in curative facilities. Since the 
disease burden in Sub-Saharan Africa is composed principally of communicable diseases 
that can be dealt with by community nurses, given the cost of a bias in training towards 
degree level and registered nurses, and given the high levels of emigration of health 
professionals from Sub-Saharan African countries, this paper strongly recommends a 
dramatic shift in donor and government health spending towards brief training and 
effective support systems for community nurses and other auxiliary workers who can 
address basic health concerns in rural areas.  
The evidence reviewed in this section suggests that building up basic education 
and health delivery systems and adjusting incentives and spending to ensure these 
systems more effectively reach into poor rural and predominantly rural areas are higher 
priorities than pursuing further experiments in technical and vocational education and 
training (TVET) schemes. This conclusion is reinforced by the finding of a number of 
studies that such training schemes and institutions have generally failed to orient their 
activities to the poor and especially to poor women. Such studies also show that there is 
little evidence that TVET succeeds in improving the necessary skills for successful 
entrepreneurship or basic survival in informal sectors. There would seem to be a greater 
need, before prioritising pre-entry and in-service training schemes, to develop more 
detailed research on the specific labour market characteristics of disadvantaged youth. 
There is also a case for allocating resources to improving the capacity of the more 
vulnerable members of the wage labour force to negotiate with employers, with a view, 
for example, to securing better workplace training. 
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5. Characteristics and Determinants of Labour Mobility: Opportunities for 
Poverty Reduction 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
One estimate of the total number of international migrants, including refugees, 
suggests that Sub-Saharan Africa contains almost 50 percent of global international 
migrants, despite containing only 10 percent of the world population (Russell et al, cited 
in Baker, 1995). Analysis of patterns of mobility in Africa suggests a few stylised facts. 
First, the scale of circulation of people within and between African countries as well as 
between Africa and the rest of the world is massive. Second, the scale of circulation is 
extremely uneven. Third, population movements can fluctuate quite suddenly – a recent 
example is the surge in migration within and from Darfur in Sudan. Fourth, patterns in 
mobility change over time. This involves both shifting spatial patterns of mobility and 
changes in the characteristics of movement: who is moving (e.g. gender composition), 
where from, where to, what for, and how. Fifth, there is a very poor level of knowledge 
about the quantitative dimensions of overall labour force circulation in Africa. Sixth, the 
labour market implications of this population circulation are especially poorly 
understood.  
There is a tension between this immense circulation of people and the abject 
provision of transport infrastructure (see below, 5.7). This means that the conditions and 
costs of mobility can be very high and that mobility is often undertaken only in extreme 
stress. It also means that despite the remarkable mobility of Africans, there are gaps in the 
links between people and productive opportunities in many parts of the continent. 
Another implication is that huge mobility is combined with excess stability. For example, 
collective violence can both project people into accelerated or unwanted mobility and it 
can also reinforce stability and isolation in areas with low productive potential such as 
South Africa's 'Bantustans' during apartheid, or drought prone and semi-arid areas of 
Ethiopia. 
Violence is one mechanism regulating this tension between mobility and weak 
infrastructure, information and communication. However, large-scale political violence is 
not the only factor. Coercive mechanisms that lie behind much ‘trafficking’ are important 
links between population mobility and labour force participation. There are also other 
long established as well as more recent patterns of coerced and so-called voluntary 
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migration, motivated and mediated by various factors including witchcraft allegations, 
divorce, infrastructural links, information networks and semi-institutionalised practices of 
corvée labour (Jeeves and Crush, 1997; Van Onselen, 1976).  Economic theory, in the 
tradition of Harriss-Todaro models of individuals making rational "choices" about 
migration destinations, has not proved very effective in analysing empirical migration 
data in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
The other main mechanism regulating population flows is social differentiation. 
Those with access to information or skills, or the resources to fund migration (transport 
costs, intermediaries’ fees, etc) are those who are most successful in migration over 
greater distances. Demographic mobility is highly uneven across Sub-Saharan Africa and 
the factors affecting this mobility vary greatly. The rates of movement are varied over 
time and across countries and regions.  For example, forced removals to clear "Black 
Spots" in South Africa in the 1960s, "Villagisation" in Tanzania in the 1970s, 
"Resettlement" in Ethiopia in the 1980s and "Ivoirité” in the 1990s all had different 
consequences in different regions of the countries concerned. The age and gender 
composition of population mobility also vary. And the quality of the labour force that is 
highly mobile also varies.  
5.2 Migration, Emigration and Immigration: Cross-Country Comparative  
Data 
 
There is very little information on the scale of flows of migrants from Africa to 
the rest of the world, though the UN International Migration Report 2002 estimates a net 
increase in the number of migrants from Africa to the developed countries during the 
1990s. Statistical analysis of international migration, from Africa to the rest of the world 
and possibly even more acutely within Africa, is fraught with data collection problems: 
censuses are scarce and often outdated; there is a lack of identity documents; false 
declarations of nationality are rife; etc.  
For illustrative purposes, data on recorded inflows and asylum applications to 
OECD countries like the UK help to identify trends.36 Two African countries, Somalia 
and Zimbabwe, feature among the sources of the largest numbers of asylum applications. 
UK evidence also shows that the largest increases in asylum applications in 2001, 
                                                 
36 There are, of course, other examples of international migration of Africans. These often have highly 
particular characteristics. For example, it was estimated that in 1990 there were some 190,000 Sudanese 
working in Iraq and a further 12,000 in Kuwait (Van Hear, 1992). 
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compared to the previous year, were all, with the exception of Afghanistan, from Africa 
(Table 16). Thus, in 2001 compared to 2000, there was a 107 percent increase in 
applicants from Zimbabwe, a 47 percent increase from Ethiopia, and a 46 percent 
increase from Sierra Leone.  
Table 16: New asylum applications to the UK 
 2000 2001 
Afghanistan 5,555 9,190 
Iraq 7,475 6,805 
Somalia 6,020 6,500 
Sri Lanka 6,395 5,545 
Turkey 3,990 3,740 
Zimbabwe 1,010 2,085 
Total incl. others 80,315 71,700 
Source: UK Refugee Council, Asylum Statistics 2001. 
 
 
The inflow of Africans to the UK has been very uneven, in terms of country of origin. 
Thus, in 2001, just four countries (Somalia, Nigeria, South Africa, and Ghana) accounted 
for 20,525 out of a total 28,515 people from Sub-Saharan Africa entering the UK in that 
year (Table 17).  
 
Table 17: Inflow of foreign population to the UK by country of 
nationality 
 
 1991 1995 2001 
Ethiopia 70 170 455 
Ghana 1,480 1,820 2,440 
Kenya 480 530 990 
Nigeria 2,870 3,260 5,040 
Somalia 510 760 8,290 
Uganda 110 440 740 
Tanzania 260 250 280 
Sierra Leone 290 440 875 
South Africa 1,050 1,300 4,755 
Zambia 170 190 354 
Sub-Saharan Africa total 7,870 10,560 28,515 
All countries total 53,900 55,480 106,820 
Source: UK Home Office Statistical Bulletin, Asylum Statistics UK 2003. 
 
Labour movements from Africa have expanded to non-traditional destinations 
within Europe, especially countries in Southern Europe, which have become net 
importers of labour over the last two decades. Spain, Portugal and Italy have received 
increasing numbers of migrants from different parts of the developing world and notably 
from Africa. In Italy, the number of legal workers from Senegal increased by, 62 percent 
 56
between 1995 and 1999 reaching 32,000. In Spain, Moroccans, a traditionally important 
migrant community (350,000 as of June 2004)37, remain the largest group of non EU 
residents, but other SSA countries, like Senegal (17,300), Gambia (12,000) and Nigeria 
(10,000) now account for a growing and significant proportion of non-EU residents, in 
spite of the formidable barriers facing SSA migrants to Europe.38  
Patchy evidence of illegal flows suggests that the actual number of African 
entrants into Southern European labour markets is far greater. Even incomplete statistics 
show a massive increase in the number of boat people (crossing the sea towards Spain’s 
mainland or the Canaries) from 3,569 in 1999 to 14,893 in 2000, and the numbers keep 
growing (Castles and Miller 2003: 84). The significance of demand-driven flows to the 
underground economies of Italy, Portugal and Spain partly explains this flux of illegal 
entrants.  
Empirical estimates of migration between African countries are extremely 
sketchy. Data published by the Migration Policy Institute (MPI) suggest there were as 
many as 2.34 million international migrants in Cote d’Ivoire in 2000, and 1.3 million in 
South Africa. However, estimates of the number of unrecorded migrants in South Africa 
vary from less than 2 million to as many as 8 million.39 As a percentage of the total 
population international migrants ranged from 1215.6 percent in Cote d’Ivoire in 1990 to 
1 percent in 2000 in Ethiopia (Table 18).  
                                                 
37 Moroccans accounted for 77 percent of all African migrants in Spain. Almost 50 percent of SSA migrants 
to Spain came from Senegal, Gambia and Nigeria. 
38 Data from the Migration Secretariat in the Ministry of Social Affairs, Spain, accessed on 25/10/04 at 
http://dgei.mir.es/es/general/tabla4_jun04.html  
39 On the unreliability of the South African data, see Standing et al, 1996: 61. 
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Table 18:   Population and migration characteristics of Africa: 1990 and 2000 
Mid-year 
population 
Estimated number of 
international migrants at 
mid-year, both sexes 
(thousands) 
International migrants as percentage 
of the total population 
Country 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 
 
AFRICA 795,671 16,221 16,277 2.6 2.0 
 Côte d'Ivoire 15,827 1,953 2,336 15.6 14.8 
 Ethiopia 65,590 1,153 660 2.4 1.0 
 Ghana 19,593 507 614 3.3 3.1 
 Kenya 30,549 146 327 0.6 1.1 
 Lesotho 1,785 7 6 0.5 0.3 
 Malawi 11,370 1,157 280 12.2 2.5 
 Mauritania 2,645 94 63 4.6 2.4 
 Mozambique 17,861 122 366 0.9 2.1 
 Senegal 9,393 293 284 4.0 3.0 
 South Africa 44,000 1,225 1,303 3.3 3.0 
 Swaziland 1,044 73 42 8.6 4.0 
 Tanzania 34,837 574 893 2.2 2.6 
 Uganda 23,487 550 529 3.2 2.3 
 Zambia 10,419 323 377 3.9 3.6 
-- Figure is zero or rounds to 0.0. 
Source: Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations (2004) Trends in 
Total Migrant Stock: The 2003 Revision. United Nations: New York, 2004. More data are available at: 
www.un.org/esa/population/publications/migstock/2003TrendsMigstock.pdf. 
 
 
5.3 International Flows of Skilled Labour 
 
Many of those migrating between states in large countries (like Nigeria), between 
African countries, and from Africa to Europe and North America are skilled. Many are 
college educated (Castles and Miller, 2003, 139). According to one estimate 233,000 
South Africans emigrated permanently between 1989 and 1997, most of them skilled 
(University of Cape Town survey, cited in The Economist, August 31st, 2000). In recent 
years this has become especially clear, for example, in the patterns of international 
migration observed among health sector workers. Some argue that health sector 
international migration to OECD countries is likely to continue rising, given labour 
shortages and ageing populations within a number of OECD countries. In some cases – 
e.g. South Africa and Zimbabwe, the numbers can be high: for example, according to one 
estimate some 18,000 Zimbabwean nurses work abroad (Mangwende, cited in Bach, 
2003). In South Africa, the number of nurses seeking verification of their qualifications  
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prior to applying for overseas employment rose from 511 in 1995 to 2,543 in 2000 (cited 
in Bach, 2003). According to another estimate cited by Bach, the flow of nurses from 
South Africa increased eightfold over the decade from 1991, of whom more than half left 
for the UK (see also Table A5). In Ghana, 60 percent of doctors educated in the 1980s 
have emigrated (UNDP survey report cited by Johnson, 2000). Overall, SSA faces the 
paradox of the presence of a large expatriate community of professionals (of the order of 
150,000) and the absence of over 300,000 African professionals in OECD countries 
(IOM, 2000). 
Emigrants often remit and sometimes return. There are also reverse flows: thus, 
Sub-Saharan African countries are significant importers of migrant labour both from 
other African countries and from beyond. Workers’ remittances to Sub-Saharan Africa 
are small fry by international comparisons: in absolute terms, no Sub-Saharan African 
country features in the top ten developing country recipients of remittances. However, 
remittances are important as a percentage of GDP in Africa, though to varying degrees 
(Table A6). Thus, Lesotho (c.28 percent) and Uganda (c.9 percent) are significantly more 
dependent on (recorded) remittances than other Sub-Saharan African countries. 
Nonetheless, the data on this subject are unreliable. For example, another estimate (IOM, 
2000) puts the share of remittances in total GDP in Lesotho at 50 percent. For some 
countries with extensive networks of informal money transfers (e.g. the hawalas), those 
linked into the foreign exchange settlement houses in Dubai, remittances are likely to be 
highly significant. For example, some estimate that the Somali economy “is now almost 
entirely remittance driven” (Ballard, 2003). Elsewhere, innovative transfer arrangements, 
such as the Kara International Exchange in Senegal, have prompted responses from more 
formalised financial organisations.  
At the more micro level, remittances make powerful contributions to prospects for 
survival. Evidence from West Africa suggests that remittances are allocated to investment 
in land improvement in some cases, to crucial consumption expenditure in others, and 
also to pay hired labour in agriculture (IMP, 2003). It has been estimated that the value of 
remittances lost to Sudan from the repatriation of migrant workers in Iraq as a result of 
the 1991 Gulf War was around $300 million (Van Hear, 1992). 
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5.4 Refugees, Forced Migrants and Internally Displaced People 
 
At the beginning of 2004 there were an estimated 4,285,100 “asylum seekers, 
refugees, and others of concern” in Sub-Saharan Africa, including internally displaced 
people, recently returned refugees and stateless people, as recorded by the UNHCR. 
 
Table 19:   Countries as Origin and Destination of Refugees (end 2003) 
 Refugees & asylum 
seekers residing in 
country 
Returned refugees Refugees elsewhere 
originating in countrya 
Cote d’Ivoire 77,292 16,600 23,741 
Ethiopia 130,284 30 61,190 
Ghana 48,034 - 15,701 
Kenya 241,535 106 3,088 
Lesotho Na Na  
Malawi 12,050 - 48 
Mauritania 530b - 30,141 
Mozambique 9,536 - 129 
Senegal  22,991 7 12,052 
South Africa 110,643 - 274 
Swaziland 1,013 - 19 
Tanzania 649,933 7 585 
Uganda 231,629 4,412 40,410 
Zambia 226,877 5 87 
a population at start of 2003. b Mauritania includes 29,500 people labelled by UNHCR as “other people of 
concern”, in this case mainly people from Western Sahara. 
 
Source: UNHCR (2004b), Tables 1 and 3. 
 
Six of the ten largest refugee flows by origin in 2003 were in Africa: Sudan, 
Burundi, the DRC, Somalia, Liberia and Angola. Nine of the ten largest refugee arrivals 
took place in Africa. And two of the largest populations of internally displaced people 
(IDPs) in 2003 were in Africa, in Liberia (531,600) and Cote d’Ivoire (38,000). Africa 
hosts around 30 percent of the global refugee population (Table A7). Tanzania hosts the 
fourth largest refugee population in the world (after Pakistan, Iran and Germany). 
Meanwhile, seven of the ten biggest voluntary repatriation flows during 2003 were in 
Africa, including 133,000 returning to Angola. As with the global trend, so in Africa 
more than half the refugees in Africa are female.  
Demographic data for some 70 percent of the 3.6 million refugees in Africa at the 
end of 2000 suggest that overall 56 percent of refugees were below the age of eighteen. 
However, this figure varies substantially between refugee populations. More than 60 
percent of refugees were children in asylum populations in Angola, Togo, the DRC, and 
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Sudan, while less than 30 percent were children in those groups in Cameroon, Mauritania, 
Nigeria, and South Africa.  
The labour force participation implications of such flows are not always well 
understood. Nonetheless, it is very clear that dramatic and often violent upheavals in one 
country frequently pitch people into the labour force in other countries, especially in 
neighbouring countries and sometimes within the same country. Women, as discussed 
below, are often forced into providing sexual services to secure their survival. Children 
may be drafted into government or rebel armed forces to serve either as combatants or as 
porters and cooks.  
South African labour markets have for a long time taken advantage of a supply of 
labour from neighbouring countries, through different mechanisms but including refuge 
from warfare. For example, during the 1980s and early 1990s there were many illegal 
immigrants from Mozambique, effectively refugees from the war there, who were 
working as wage labourers on commercial farms, as domestic servants in rural areas, and 
in the urban mining and manufacturing sectors (Sender, 2003). More recently, political 
upheaval in Zimbabwe has generated a reversal in historical patterns of labour migration 
as Zimbabweans cross into Mozambique, many in search of work in new agribusinesses 
in Manica Province. In Western Tanzania in the 1990s, when there were large populations 
of refugees, there was a widening of the market (e.g. for bananas) and a larger pool of 
labour: local farmers often hired refugees to work as farm labourers, paying them in food 
and/or cash (Whitaker, 1999).  
However, it is costly to migrate, even to flee. Labour migration to neighbouring 
countries can become poorer households’ asylum migration, “if the purpose of that 
migration is thought of as being broadly the security of the whole household, rather than 
more narrowly as a source of protection for an individual. For the poorest households 
migration outside the country is rarely an option, since such households cannot afford to 
send any members abroad” (van Hear, 2004, 12). 
5.5 Trafficking 
 
Very little is known about the scale of trafficking in human beings in Africa. 
There are no reliable estimates of levels of trafficking in Africa or globally; even the 
definition of the term remains unclear (UNICEF, 2003). What is clear is that actual 
patterns and their causes defy simple generalisations: patterns and causes vary within 
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Africa, despite a general view that poverty, violence, and power (including gender 
discrimination) are key influences. There are a number of push factors. However, it is 
also clear that demand forces pull people – especially women and children – into the 
labour force through trafficking mechanisms, drawing women and girls into sexual labour 
markets and pulling women and children into domestic service or into agricultural labour 
(e.g. on West African cotton and cocoa plantations).  
Trafficking of different kinds – some more obviously coercive than others – is a 
long-established mechanism for releasing labour supply in Africa. In northern Tanzania 
there is evidence of trafficked youth being sent back to their villages to recruit new 
children for work in the tanzanite mines. Parents are often implicated in pushing children 
into trafficking networks. Research in Togo found that it is not uncommon for parents to 
accept money from traffickers, for distant relatives to pay intermediaries to find work 
abroad, or for parents to hand over children on the promise of education or paid work 
(Human Rights Watch, 2003). There is also an overlap between trafficking and refugee 
flows. For example, there is ongoing research on trafficking of refugees in host countries 
to mobilise cheap labour (e.g. from Congolese and Rwandan refugee camps inside 
Tanzania to agricultural plantations in Tanzania).  
The patterns are complex. For example, one major set of flows runs from East and 
Southern African countries southwards towards South Africa, a major destination 
country. In West Africa there is a more circular pattern of trafficking flows. Cote d’Ivoire 
and Nigeria, for example, are clearly major destinations but also countries of origin for 
flows of people to other countries in the region. Gabon features more sharply as a 
destination, while other countries like Senegal and Togo are more generally viewed as 
countries of origin. Beyond this there are important trafficking flows from Africa to 
Europe and the Middle East.  
5.6 Violence and Labour Supply 
 
Populations in Sub-Saharan Africa have experienced high levels of both collective 
and interpersonal violence. Violence in war and peace has substantial effects on the 
formation of the labour force: it affects the rate of growth of the labour force and its 
absolute size, and it affects the quality of labour.  
War in general is an “amplifier of disease” (USIP, 2001). Evidence from Uganda 
shows clearly how spatio-temporal patterns of violent conflict unleash patterns in the 
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spread of HIV infection. HIV incidence in Uganda rose sharply during the war of the 
1980s, declined on aggregate during the relative peace in the first half of the 1990s and 
then rose again, especially in conflict affected areas, in the past few years (Epstein, 2001; 
Ronaldson, 2000).  It is widely accepted that seroprevalence rates are higher than average 
in military forces – according to some estimates as high as 60 per cent in Angola and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo.  
Women have historically been targets of violence during war – both as victims of 
‘opportunist violence’ and as part of the strategy of conflict. The implications of wartime 
sexual violence have changed with HIV/AIDS. Carballo and Solby (2001) estimate that 
some 200,000 women were raped during conflict in Rwanda in the early 1990s. Human 
Rights Watch (2002) and the International Crisis Group (2003) claim that sexual violence 
has reached extreme proportions in the conflict in Eastern Congo. If rape leads to HIV 
infection this affects morbidity and mortality, dependency ratios and conditions within 
households, with knock-on effects reducing children’s access to education. 
The effects of violence can include destruction of or damage to health and 
education facilities (including schools and health posts but also teachers and health 
workers), weakened access to such services because of insecurity and/or broken transport 
infrastructure, and dramatic depreciation of skills and capabilities through physical, 
psychological and relational damage. Accurately estimating such effects is notoriously 
difficult, for methodological and data availability reasons.  
The effects of violence on the supply and quality of labour are complex and 
poorly understood. There has been a bias in the literature on collective violence and 
armed conflict towards discussing the consequences of violence for asset wealth, as 
opposed to the consequences for labour participation. If household assets are lost (Matovu 
and Stewart, 2001), if markets are fragmented and thinned out, if household members are 
killed or debilitated as a result of violence, then a priori two consequences may follow. 
First, collective violence may produce a “retreat into subsistence”. It is often claimed that 
this is precisely what happens: as market opportunities and agricultural inputs become 
scarce, as labour productivity is weakened and households are broken up by violence, 
rural households are often expected to shrink further into a shell of survival activities. Or 
it is suggested that, faced with the prospect of asset losses, “people try to protect their 
assets by shifting wealth abroad” (Collier, Hoeffler and Pattillo, 2002). However, second, 
exactly these conditions may be expected to push people into participating in labour 
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markets where otherwise they might have resisted participation. In other words, even 
subsistence becomes unviable, so out of desperation people join the labour force, 
including women from households in which males have been killed or disabled or simply 
recruited into military forces. The desperate conditions of war that push people into 
labour force participation have a particular effect in that women are “often forced into 
high-risk sexual behaviour…by trading or selling unprotected sex for goods, services, and 
cash in order to survive and/or continue their travel” during war and episodes of forced 
migration (UNAIDS, 2001). 
Normal barriers to labour market participation in some ways become even more 
constraining during war. In wartime roads and railways are often damaged or fall into 
disrepair and traffic services become scarcer. Many sources of labour demand can also 
dry up during wartime. Therefore, logically there may be a build up of labour market 
pressure during wartime. How this is resolved is bound to vary. It is essentially very 
poorly understood. Almost all work on the economics of war has concentrated on the 
livelihood and asset costs of violence and has assumed there is a typical retreat into 
subsistence. The labour market question has barely been asked.  
An exception is Wuyts (2003), reviewing research on wartime Mozambique. 
There the dearth of goods effectively accelerated processes of social differentiation and 
labour force participation.  “Far from retreating into a subsistence economy, therefore, the 
war and crisis heightened the need for the poorer peasantry to sell their labour to obtain 
cash to buy food and other rural wage goods”. For while war conditions break up some 
sources of labour demand they also tend to generate other sources of demand. Production 
and trade of alluvial diamonds in Angola, of coltan in Congo, of timber and gemstones in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone, and so on, are all central to war finance and war duration: none 
are possible without a labour force. However, in wartime conditions formal regulation of 
labour markets hardly exists (Krishnamurti, 2003). Labour conditions are often 
regressive. Labour market opportunities in wartime might provide desperately needed 
opportunities for survival but they often involve awful conditions, including those of 
slavery.40  
The labour market implications of interpersonal, as opposed to collective, violence 
are similarly complex. Whether or not a person, especially a girl or woman, participates 
                                                 
40 See Luckham et al (2001) and Collinson (ed.) (2003). 
 64
in labour markets, which segments of labour markets she can join, and the quality of her 
working life will depend in part on whether she has been subjected to violence, either as 
part of episodes of collective violence and warfare or as a result of interpersonal violence. 
There has been increasing empirical attention, in the economic literature, to interpersonal 
violence, including homicide, violence against children, and violence against and abuse of 
women and girls, and to the economic implications of this violence.41 Research has begun 
to reveal how common interpersonal violence is in many parts of the world as well as 
trying to trace its direct and indirect costs.  
For example, WHO (2003) reported estimates of the rates of homicide of children 
under five years old of 2.2 per 100,000 boys and 1.8 per 100,000 girls in high-income 
countries; 6.1 and 5.1 per 100,000 boys and girls in low- and middle-income countries; 
and 17.9 and 12.7 per 100,000 boys and girls, respectively, in Africa. An estimated 0.9 
youth homicides were committed per 100,000 in high-income countries in 2000, 
compared with estimates of 17.6 per 100,000 in Africa and 36.4 per 100,000 in Latin 
America (WHO, 2004, 24).42 
However, it is also clear that there is less evidence for these low and middle-
income countries. Indeed, there is, generally, very little robust and comprehensive data 
that might enable a clear identification of trends or provide a basis for credible 
comparisons between countries or between different parts of particular countries.43  
The evidence to date shows, that violence is an important factor – aside, for 
example, from wage signals – in influencing labour market participation as well as 
productivity. Women who seek wage employment against the wishes of their husbands 
are often severely beaten (Sender et al, 2004).  Interpersonal violence can damage labour 
productivity through psychological harm, physical debilitation or deprivation of access to 
education, training, welfare services and so on. This goes for violence outside and within 
the workplace itself. Interpersonal violence – especially perhaps its effects on girls – can 
                                                 
41 There are different definitions of violence: they range from those emphasising more narrowly physical 
damage and intent to hurt or with lack of consent of the victim to broader definitions that include 
psychological threats and abuse and the even broader category of “structural violence”, which typically 
highlights social institutions that repress individuals’ scope for choice and fulfilment. 
42 The direct medical costs of gunshot violence were estimated at $10,308 per victim at one hospital in Cape 
Town, South Africa, while another analysis estimated that these direct costs made up just 13 percent of the 
total cost of gun violence for victims (WHO, 2004, 26). 
43 Different sources – crime reports, hospital records, household surveys, and so on – are drawn on to 
compile estimates. Many violent acts are either not reported or – as is common in the case of rape – 
reported but not recorded by officials.  
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reduce educational attainment. And the fiscal costs of interpersonal violence, which can 
be substantial, may have a knock-on effect on the budgetary scope for investing in decent 
health and education services and transport and communications infrastructure that 
support the development of the labour force.44  
Empirical evidence of domestic violence in Sub-Saharan Africa, predominantly 
against adult and adolescent women, is limited though expanding. Some evidence, for 
example, emerged from a survey of 5,109 sexually active women of reproductive age in 
the Rakai district of rural southwest Uganda in 2000/01 (Koenig et al, 2003). Researchers 
found that 30.4 percent of women in the survey had experienced physical threats or 
violence from their current male partner. The main “risk factors” associated with patterns 
of reporting domestic violence were women’s education, alcohol consumption in the 
household, and women’s age at first sexual intercourse. Women with secondary schooling 
had lower risks of violence and women who became sexually active below 15 years old 
were more likely to have suffered recent violence.  
There has been more research on domestic and sexual violence in South Africa 
than elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa. Some of this research focuses on particular 
settings, e.g. on pervasive – but still poorly quantified – domestic violence against women 
taking place among permanent and seasonal workers’ families living on commercial 
farms (Fast, 1997; Sunde and Kleinbooi, 1999; Parenzee and Smythe, 2003).  
There is also more nationally representative data. The first national female 
homicide study in South Africa collected data retrospectively on homicides of women 
aged 14 and above in 1999, from a nationally representative sample of 25 mortuaries 
(Mathews et al, 2004). Of a sample population total of 3,798 female homicides, 1,349 or 
just more than 40 percent of those cases for which data could be traced were cases of 
“intimate femicide”: women killed by an intimate partner. The findings suggested that 
                                                 
44 Pfizer (2001, cited in WHO, 2004) estimated that crime and violence together cost the equivalent of 5 
percent of the GNP of industrialised economies and as much as 14 percent of the GNP of low-income 
countries. Comparative evidence from Central America shows some of the effects of one type of non-war 
violence, i.e. domestic and largely gendered violence. Some studies suggest, for example, that the health 
burden of gender-based victimisation of women between the ages of 15 and 44 is comparable with that 
resulting from other risks such as HIV/AIDS, cancer, tuberculosis, and cardiovascular disease. Domestic 
violence has inter-generational costs too: the children of abused women often have worse health than 
others. There may be no consensus on whether or not domestic violence affects women’s participation in 
the labour force in Central America. However, there is plenty of evidence showing that violence reduces 
women’s labour productivity.  
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four women are killed every day by an intimate partner and that one in every two women 
killed by a known perpetrator is killed by an intimate partner.45  
Another kind of violence that affects the quality of labour supply is violence 
against girls in schools. Where gender based violence and coercion are the norm, not only 
does this raise the risk of girls dropping out and experiencing teenage unintended 
pregnancies, but also it raises the risk of contracting STDs, including HIV/AIDS. Yet 
violence and abuse of girls in schools is widespread. Precise data are elusive but the 
evidence has been gradually accumulating (Hallam, 1994). This violence can be 
perpetrated by teachers and by other students. Afenyadu and Goparaju (2003) report a 
survey of 400 in-school and out of school adolescents in Dodowa, Ghana in which they 
found that in-school female adolescents were more susceptible to forced sex, junior 
secondary school girls being the most susceptible. 67 percent of girls in a survey in 
schools in Botswana (of 560 students) reported sexual harassment by teachers. Surveys in 
South Africa and Cameroon, Kenya, Malawi, and Zimbabwe confirm that violence 
against and abuse of girls in schools is a widespread phenomenon and that there are no 
government policies to address it (USAID, 2004). 
Most of the studies of violence against girls in schools claim that there are 
deleterious educational effects. For example, researchers in South Africa found that girls 
reported being unable to concentrate, losing interest in school, and sometimes dropping 
out, in the aftermath of sexual violence. Other studies confirm these findings (see USAID, 
2004; Leach et al, 2003).  
There is a range of policy challenges here. First, in many countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa there simply is very little formal legislation. However, second, in countries where 
there are formal laws and procedures designed to restrict and respond to sexual and 
domestic violence, enforcement is weak (Parenzee and Smythe, 2003). Enforcement is 
weak for two main reasons. Organisations charged with implementing laws and 
procedures do not always act with much commitment (Leach et al, 2003: viii). And many 
women, especially in rural areas, either do not have enough knowledge of the laws or  
                                                 
45 The South African context also shows the problems of conducting research into sexual violence (Jewkes 
and Abrahams, 2000). While police records suggest 240 rapes per 100,000 women annually, some 
community surveys suggest that as many as 2,070 rapes took place per 100,000 women in the 17-48 age 
group annually. Non-consensual sex within marriages is thought to be extremely common and barely 
reported at all. This is why some researchers talk of an iceberg of sexual coercion, in which recorded 
incidents are merely the small, visible tip.  
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cannot get access to legal protection because of the high cost and poor transport and 
communications infrastructure. Therefore, reducing the effect of violence as a constraint 
on labour force formation and on labour supply may be a benefit of public investments 
that, as this report argues, have other labour supply objectives. Other policy initiatives are 
also necessary. These include investment in public information campaigns through radio 
and health posts; incentives to police to improve recording of gender-based violence 
incidents; and potentially – following initiatives in parts of Latin America – creating 
women-only police stations.  
 
5.7 Transport and Communications Infrastructure 
 
Increased mobility is an important part of the process of poverty reduction, with 
both private and social returns. Constraints on mobility restrict the potential labour supply 
in response to geographical labour demand and deprive people of access to information, 
remittances, and ideas, which contribute to raising labour productivity.  Cross-country 
econometric studies tend to show a clear positive effect of investment in infrastructure on 
growth; however, some of the poverty-reducing effects show through more clearly in 
studies of different regional performance within large developing countries. This is the 
case in IFPRI analyses of India and China: in both countries the research suggested the 
need for incremental spending for poverty reduction on rural roads. The IFPRI work also 
showed that a “particularly important factor in the reduction of poverty in both countries 
was growth of rural non-farm employment and this in turn was heavily dependent on the 
availability of infrastructure services” (Willoughby, 2002, 7).  
Transport infrastructure helps not just by facilitating labour mobility and labour 
market participation but also through easing the provision of and access to other services 
that raise labour market quality. For example, research in Vietnam (Deolalikar, 2001) 
suggests that the presence of a road in a community brings about sizeable improvements 
in secondary school enrolment and use of public health facilities in poorer provinces 
(while making a smaller difference in better off provinces).46 Other research reinforces 
the significance of transport infrastructure spending on poor areas but argues that the 
return to transport investment is raised significantly when it is combined with spending 
                                                 
46 See also Glewwe et al (2000). Nonetheless, it is remarkable how the questionnaires behind survey data on 
infrastructure and poverty typically fail to ask detailed questions about labour market implications of 
infrastructural provision, beyond the issue of labour-intensive infrastructure construction.  
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on education, health and other services. An additional argument for integrated policies is 
that they are required to reduce the danger that facilitating labour mobility will also 
spread HIV/AIDS, as well as other sexually transmitted diseases.  Migration is commonly 
cited as an important factor contributing to the spread of HIV/AIDS (Pison et al, 1993; 
Lurie et al, 2003).  
There are four broad categories of people for whom increasing transport 
infrastructure provision and usage means a higher risk of exposure to HIV/AIDS: people 
employed in building and maintenance of infrastructure; people working for transport 
service providers; those working in the sector as managers; and passengers.47 For 
example, road construction in Malawi has been linked to the spread of HIV/AIDS; there 
have been high seroprevalence rates recorded among bus and truck drivers in Cameroon 
and Tanzania (and for their female partners); the increase in mobility associated with the 
onset of peace and the reconstruction of transport infrastructure in Mozambique after 
1992 was associated with accelerating seroprevalence rates; the most recent data for 
Mozambique suggests that prevalence is very much lower in the more remote rural 
Northern areas that are far from the major trade and transport corridors; and so on.48 
Africa’s transport infrastructure is notoriously limited. Rural road density has 
been estimated at about 32 m/km2 in Western Africa and 36 m/km2 in Eastern and 
Southern Africa on average (Riverson et al., 1991, p. 4). Even this provision is highly 
unequal. Three countries in West Africa (Cameroon, Ivory Coast and Nigeria) account for 
more than half the rural roads, while in Eastern and Southern Africa four countries 
(Madagascar, Tanzania, Zaire and Zimbabwe) account for more than two-thirds of the 
rural roads. Another study shows that rural road density varies in West Africa from 17 
km/1,000 km2 in Ghana, to 36 km/1,000km2 in Cameroon, to 94 km/1,000 km2 in Cote 
d’Ivoire (Table 20). Nigeria has about 97 m/km2 of rural roads, “but an acceptable ‘target’ 
density, based on Indian experience in areas with similar population densities to those in 
Nigeria, would be about 730 m, that is, more than eight times as much as the latter 
country presently has” (Platteau, 1996). Villages are typically distant from all-weather 
                                                 
47 World Bank, “Document 3(A): HIV/AIDS and the Transport Sector”, in Considering HIV/AIDS in 
Development Assistance: A Toolkit. 
48 On Cameroon  and Tanzania see AIDS Analysis Africa, Vol.4, No.5 (1994) and Vol.5, No.2 (1995) 
respectively; on Mozambique see the Mozambique Human Development Report, 1998. Fieldwork evidence 
from Nampula Province (Mozambique) suggests that seroprevalence rates are substantially higher in areas 
close to stations along the railway line between the port of Nacala and Malawi. 
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roads. Even in Zimbabwe, 75 per cent of farms are situated more than 5 km away from an 
all-weather road (ibid). 
 
Table 20:   Rural Road Network in Selected African Countries 
 
 Total (km) Density (km/1,000 km2) 
Cameroon 18,000 36 
Cote d’Ivoire 30,224 94 
Ghana 4,000 17 
Mozambique 6,725 17 
Nigeria 67,425 97 
Tanzania 20,760 66 
Source: NEPAD, Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme, 2002 
(http://www.fao.org/docrep/005)  
 
Moreover, rural roads in much of Africa are of poor quality. Some 10 per cent are 
paved, compared with about 35 per cent in Asia. During rainy seasons many roads are 
impassable. According to one study, in Tanzania the percentage of roads in good 
condition in 1990 was 24 percent, compared to 50 percent in Malawi, 40 percent in 
Zambia, and 32 percent in Kenya. 
An important implication is that for many people in Africa the costs of mobility 
are extremely high and the means generally basic. Many rural Africans live in a “walking 
world” because they are too far from roads and/or because of the lack of transport 
services. Indeed, rural transport costs are higher than anywhere else in the world. Porter 
(2002) cites estimates that transport charges for journeys of up to 30 km are as much as 
two and a half times more expensive in Africa than in Asia. Transporters in Ghana’s 
Central Region, for example, commonly charge double for journeys over bad roads. 
Living “off road” has critical implications for the quality of the labour force. Access to 
health care is typically bad: research in Ghana and Uganda suggests, for example, that 
vaccination programmes may miss off-road settlements (Porter, 2002). Access to markets 
and traders is poor. And access to credit institutions and rural banks or post offices is 
extremely limited.  
Communications infrastructure as well as transport infrastructure is highly 
unevenly distributed between African countries (Tables A27 and A28). For example, the 
distribution of fixed and mobile phone subscribers per 1,000 people varies from 4.76 in 
Ethiopia and 10.58 in Malawi to 54.98 in Senegal and 352.63 in South Africa.  Apart 
from the need to travel and to communicate, migrant and mobile workers urgently need to 
have access to financial services.  In particular, they need safe and low-cost money 
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transmission and savings facilities, in order to meet their obligations to the children and 
women who depend on their remittances in rural areas.  Private sector financial 
institutions, such as banks, have not found it profitable to establish widespread rural 
branch networks in Sub-Saharan Africa.  The growth of such private networks usually 
depends on prior state investments, for example in rural post offices, to establish savings 
habits and create the market for subsequent private financial sector growth.   
The spread of rural post offices, postal collections and savings facilities is uneven 
across Sub-Saharan Africa.  Table 21 shows that there are large differences between 
countries in the number of post offices that accept financial transactions, ranging from 
only 60 in Uganda to 485 in Kenya, 327 in Ghana and 241 in Tanzania.  The average 
number of inhabitants served by each post office in Ethiopia is about 116,000, compared 
to 29,000 in Ghana and 36,000 in Kenya.  There has been little research on the potential 
role that rural post offices could play in facilitating labour market integration, financial 
flows and savings in rural Africa.  In addition, the absence of modern money transmission 
facilities probably contributes to the prevalence of robberies, banditry and armed gangs of 
youth threatening the survival prospects of the poor and pensioners in several regions of 
Africa (Issa, 2004; Cross, 2003: 20). 
 
Table 21: Post Offices Accepting Financial Transactions, 2003 
 Number of Post Offices 
(Permanent and 
Mobile) 
Accepting Financial 
Transactions 
Average Number of 
Inhabitants Served by 
a Permanent Post 
Office ('000) 
Average Area Covered by a 
Permanent Post Office 
( '000 Km2) 
Cote DÍvoire 192 86 1.7 
Ethiopia 130 116 1.8 
Ghanaa 327 29 0.3 
Kenya 485 36 0.7 
Lesotho 47 12 0.2 
Malawi 176 37 0.4 
Mauritaniab 61 - 16.8 
Mozambique 117 69 2.9 
Senegal 137 74 1.4 
South Africa  2,137 17 0.5 
Swaziland 39 19 0.3 
Tanzania 241 88 2.2 
Uganda 60 - 0.7 
Zambia 180 46 3.2 
        aData for 2001 
        bData for 1999 
      Source: Universal Postal Union, Postal Statistics, 2004: http://www.upu.int 
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5.8 Summary and Conclusions 
 
The movement of people in Africa and its implications for labour supply are 
characterised by the same unevenness, between and within countries that other sections of 
this paper have shown to be a feature of all labour supply trends in the region. The 
evidence reviewed above suggests two significant themes. First, two of the most 
important mechanisms regulating flows of people are coercion and social differentiation. 
The majority of Africans who migrate voluntarily are able to do so because they have 
advantages compared to others: advantages in wealth, knowledge, status and contacts. 
Second, there is a tension between this high labour force mobility and the conditions of 
transport infrastructure, financial market infrastructure, and communications. The 
extreme unevenness as well as generally poor provision of infrastructure throughout 
much of sub-Saharan Africa reinforces the significance of the two mechanisms mentioned 
above – coercion and socio-economic differentiation – in shaping patterns of mobility and 
labour market participation. Further, the condition of the infrastructure, especially in rural 
areas, raises the costs for those left behind of education, health care, access to savings 
institutions, and access to opportunities for migration.  
There are many pressures on political leaders to design and impose further 
intentional barriers to mobility. These are commonly driven by ideological anxieties 
about population movements, fears for the effects on sending communities of out 
migration or brain drain, and fears of people in ‘host’ populations about a rising tide of 
migrants unfairly competing with local workers. On both efficiency and equity grounds, 
there should ideally be no barriers designed to restrict population movement within Sub-
Saharan Africa or from Africa to the rest of the world. Administrative impediments to 
mobility are frequently expensive to run and invariably ineffective. Given that those with 
the wherewithal generally succeed in migrating across borders and internationally, adding 
legal barriers to those that already exist is only likely to reinforce the inequalities in the  
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labour force and to deepen poverty.49 Further, these policies effectively criminalise 
migration and, therefore, drive people into the unregulated and exploitative working 
conditions that are the fate of so many migrant workers.  There is an urgent need to 
develop new policies and new types of temporary immigrant workers programme that 
more actively promote the interests of migrant workers by more clearly defining, and 
more effectively enforcing, certain core rights of migrant workers. 50 The policy 
emphasis, in other words, should shift away from trying to repress the irrepressible to 
trying to protect the rights of and prospects for African migrants. 
The aim of policy should be both to improve communications and transport 
infrastructure dramatically, and to encourage institutional and policy reforms that 
recognise and record migrant labourers as a foundation for protecting them from abusive 
working relationships. The benefits of this policy approach would include: facilitating the 
circulation of remittance money within families; making more people easier to reach with 
vaccination programmes, HIV/AIDS testing and prevention campaigns, and other health 
and education services; and reducing the scope for violent and super-exploitative 
intermediaries to fill the gap in aiding mobility.  
There is a case for new forms of policy intervention to manage particular types of 
labour flows, however. As discussed above, there has been a rise in the number of health 
sector professionals migrating from African countries – to other African countries and 
further afield. The policy options for tackling this situation include: greater sharing of 
information on vacancies between countries; public sector involvement in labour 
migration schemes for public sector service professionals; and greater expenditure on 
salaries and to improve the working conditions of nurses and doctors in countries like 
Ghana and Zimbabwe from which there has been substantial leakage in recent years. In 
OECD countries, most of which fall short of published targets for ODA as a share of 
GDP and in many of which there are political complaints about the public cost of care for 
                                                 
49 This argument is supported by Hatton and Williamson (2002). On the basis of projections from historical 
evidence of mass migration from poor Europe in the late nineteenth century to future mass emigration flows 
from Africa, they argue that the magnitudes of African migration to Europe are likely to rise considerably 
over the next few decades. They argue that some efforts to restrict migration and to seal porous borders 
might be partially successful but that they will create unpleasant side effects. “European restrictions will 
create a greater share of illegals and thus greater absorption problems in recipient nations: European 
restrictions will create more poverty in African sending regions. And European restrictions will create 
considerable diplomatic problems between the two regions”. 
50 The practical and ethical arguments underpinning the design of such programmes have been examined by 
Chang and Ruhs (2004). 
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refugees and immigrants, there should be greater education on the role of nurses and 
doctors from Africa, given that African countries are effectively subsidising health 
service provisions (public and private) in the OECD countries. One estimate is that the 
scale of these subsidies is of the order of $500 million per annum (Joint Learning 
Initiative, 2004: 102). 
6. Conclusions: Some Implications of a New Policy Focus on the Poorest, Most 
Disadvantaged Labour Force Entrants 
 
6.1 National Data Gaps  
 
Data on labour supply and employment are difficult to obtain and are less reliable 
than many other socio-economic indicators. Gaps in the data are evident in the most basic 
official tabulations.51 The donor agencies do not appear to recognize the severity of these 
problems, since they have not prioritised policies to improve the data on African labour 
markets. This paper argues that there is a need for more and better pro-poor survey and 
statistical work on African labour markets.  
High labour participation rates and low levels of “formal” sector recorded 
employment are a remarkable feature of the published data on Sub-Saharan African 
labour markets. The typical national household survey shows that agriculture accounts for 
60-80 percent of the labour force; most adult household members are classified as either 
‘independent’, ‘own account’ agricultural producers or ‘unpaid family workers’. These 
three categories usually account for about 80 percent of the agricultural labour force. 
However, these categories are ‘residual’, in the sense that enumerators assume, without 
detailed investigation of patterns of activity over time, that most people are own-account 
or family workers in rural areas. It follows that, if these own account occupations are 
taken as given and if few young people are in schools or colleges, then labour market 
participation rates are high by definition. 
The concepts and interpretations of ‘employment’ and ‘unemployment’ are deeply 
ambiguous. Depending on how questions are worded and interpreted by survey  
                                                 
51For example, the ILO’s Global Employment Trends 2003 presents labour market indicators for 19 African 
countries, but data for employment growth covering the period 1995-99 are only given for three of these 
countries, while data for the whole period 1990-99 are available for four countries.  Unemployment rates 
are given for 14 countries in 1999, but only for two countries in 1990. Nevertheless, labour force growth 
estimates are presented for all 19 countries, simply as estimated projections from general population data, 
available from censuses (ILO 2004e, pp. 138-45).  
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respondents and enumerators, one or another dimension of unemployment will take 
precedence, thus making international and even intra-national comparisons misleading. 
Given the definitions in use, it is obvious that unemployment rates in many Sub-Saharan 
African countries will be low by international standards, because of the very low levels of 
unemployment recorded in rural areas where, as argued above, most people are simply 
assumed to be engaged in some type of activity.  If some studies suggest that 
unemployment is high, especially among certain groups like the urban youth, their results 
may be explained mainly by differences in sampling, in definitions used, and in the way 
conventions of data collection are applied.52  
In sum, the insufficient coverage and differences in definitions, years, and sources 
of data may lead to spurious and misleading comparisons between African countries. 
Moreover, the concepts and definitions used (employed, economically active population, 
unemployed) may be inappropriate, since their meaning depends on the level of 
development and the specific features of labour markets. Unfortunately, the poorest 
Africans participate in precisely those labour markets that cannot be understood on the 
basis of official statistics. 
6.2 Microeconomic Research on Unregistered/Unrecorded Wage Labour and the 
Need for New Modules for LSMS 
 
Many recent household sample surveys show tiny proportions of people in wage 
employed categories.  Their samples include very few agricultural workers, domestic 
servants, cleaners, porters, bus drivers and touts, migrant workers engaged in road 
construction, bar tenders, workers on food stalls or in restaurants, petty salesmen 
(employed by traders), etc.  However, these wage workers, as well as women working for 
wages in the sexual services sector, are very numerous in the rural and urban areas of 
Sub-Saharan African countries. The quantitative importance of the waged work of 
domestic servants has been obscured by the tendency to record non-kin-related residents 
in households as “unpaid family workers”, when it would be more appropriate to classify 
them as domestic servants, receiving irregular and small amounts of pocket money, food 
and lodging as their wage.   
                                                 
52In spite of efforts to standardise definitions, these still vary between countries; small variations, e.g. in 
terms of the minimum age accepted for employment questions (as shown in Table A13), can have a 
significant impact on the comparability of data across countries. Most researchers working with cross-
country datasets are unaware of or indifferent to this problem (Behrman and Rosenzweig, 1994).  
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Many, but not all, of these statistically invisible wage workers belong to the 
poorest quintile of rural households; a more disaggregated classification of the different 
types of irregular wage employment would identify those segments of the unenumerated 
rural labour market that contain the largest numbers of very poor people. For example, 
there is micro-survey evidence that suggests that the poorest rural households in the Ivory 
Coast and Kenya are far more dependent on unskilled farm wage income than the richest 
households and, in Rwanda, dependence on unskilled wage labour is higher in female 
headed and illiterate households (Barrett et al, 2001: 12, 26).53 
The ILO has stressed the lack of reliable statistics on waged agricultural labour 
and highlights the need for “comprehensive disaggregated statistics”, since wage 
employment in agriculture in poor countries is “invisible” in most conventional databases 
(ILO, 2003: 42).   Other empirical studies have highlighted the neglect of rural non-farm 
employment in national datasets (Elbers et al, 2003; Bryceson 1999), as well as the fact 
that casual labour markets are dynamic in rural areas and that non-agricultural 
employment in rural areas of Sub-Saharan Africa is significant and growing (Reardon 
1997; Kevane 1994; Sender 2003; Wiggins 2000; Adams, 1991).  Limited evidence from 
African micro-surveys (Sender, 2002; Sender et al, 2004), as well as strong evidence from 
India, suggests that the move from casual forms of rural wage employment to more 
regular rural wage employment, implying higher annual real wages, is decisive in 
reducing poverty (Ghose, 2004: 5112).  Thus, a key indicator of poverty reduction, 
largely ignored in official statistical publications, is the rate of growth of real wages in 
rural areas.  The wage rate for (female) casual agricultural labour is usually the lowest 
real wage rate in the economy.  Monitoring changes in these real wages is particularly 
relevant for assessing trends in standards of living in the poorest households.  
The results of random household surveys, such as the LSMS, are usually 
presented as the most accurate and complete information concerning the characteristics of 
poor people, including their employment patterns. However, LSMS sampling techniques 
and their questionnaires do not take full account of the degree of heterogeneity within 
rural areas.  The problem is that, in African contexts, the distribution of all rural resources 
and opportunities, including access to different types of employment, is extremely uneven 
                                                 
53 More than 60 percent of rural households in the Ivory Coast and Kenya (and more than 44 percent of 
Rwandan households) earn income from off-farm agricultural wage labour, usually seasonal, casual labour 
(ibid). 
 76
(Kevane 1994; Reardon 1997; Bryceson 1999; Sender 2003). Thus, important ‘pockets’ 
of various forms of wage employment, which are by no means uniformly distributed 
throughout the country, may easily be missed in random surveys. Also, significant 
movements of labour to and from some dynamic ‘pockets’ may not be captured because 
LSMS sampling frames are inaccurate , or because standard definitions of “the 
household” and its “residents” are too narrow, leading to a failure to collect information 
from “non-residents” concerning migration episodes in search of wage employment.   
The risk of failing to include large numbers of disadvantaged labour force entrants 
in the sample provides a rationale for complementary sampling approaches, purposively 
designed to capture the characteristics of specific groups of wage workers, especially 
those engaged in seasonal, casual and low-paid jobs outside major urban centres. These 
are people not usually “resident” in “households”.  They live and work for long periods in 
hostels, barracks, construction sites and illegal squatter settlements, or they have been 
given some space to sleep at their workplace during the harvest season, or while working 
as domestic servants.   These types of employees are easily missed in conventional 
samples such as LSMS or DHS, because of their focus on a random, population-census-
weighted selection of rural and urban enumeration areas and their choice of “household 
residents” as the unit of analysis.  
There are other problems in the way recent household surveys have been 
conducted that have resulted in insufficiently detailed labour market information covering 
specific occupational categories.  To overcome these problems, more appropriate, 
disaggregated and context-specific occupational and status categories are required, in 
order to understand the complexity of what is often vaguely called ‘informal’ 
employment.54   Ideally, more detailed information could be derived from more 
comprehensive labour force surveys (LFS) but, as shown in Table A11, these are 
organized irregularly and with substantial lags.   Instead, living standards measurement 
surveys (LSMS) and Household Budget Surveys have now become the main source of 
socio-economic data in Sub-Saharan Africa. Unfortunately, these surveys have been 
driven by the search for extraordinarily detailed consumption data for the calculation of  
                                                 
54 The definition of the informal sector adopted in 1993 by ILO has significant loopholes and remains 
vague, leaving room for different interpretations. Estimates of ‘informal’ employment and activities are 
often indirect, based on the residual balance technique, which depends on different choices of assumptions.  
These choices frequently differ between sources (Charmes, 1999). 
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national poverty incidence rates.  The result is that other types of policy relevant socio-
economic survey that focus on the specificities of rural labour market activity or HIV 
sero-prevalence, for instance, have been neglected.  
The employment sections of LSMS are very brief.  They aim to collect very 
general information for international comparisons.  LSMS employment modules ask 
standard questions concerning employment during a very short reference period (one 
week).  However, in any particular week, a rural person who often works as a casual 
wage labourer could be engaged in some form of self-employment.  Similarly, a person 
who is often engaged in non-farming activities could be engaged in farming.  This is 
recognised by the Indian National Sample Survey Organisation, which regularly 
investigates employment patterns every five years, using a much longer reference period - 
365 days.  These surveys are richer in content and relevance than the standard labour 
force surveys or the LSM Surveys conducted in Africa (Ghose, 2004).  In a few countries 
(including Mozambique), there has recently been an effort to include a question that 
departs from the standard conventions and covers a reference period that extends across 
the entire agricultural season, e.g. “Has any member of the household been hired out 
during the last agricultural season?”   
However, there is still a great deal of room to incorporate more detailed questions 
concerning people’s experience of seasonal and irregular employment in an expanded 
LSMS employment module.  In the current LSMS questionnaires, respondents are rarely 
given the opportunity to describe their full array of occupations or to discuss the details 
concerning their allocation of labour to different survival strategies.55 
Merely extending the reference period to capture seasonality does not guarantee 
the reliability of estimates of economic activity. In an ongoing village-level survey in 
Mauritania, an implausibly high proportion of respondents answered ‘never’ to the 
question “Have you participated in any kind of remunerated activity over the past 12 
months?” in two of three sampled villages. Subsequent responses to other, open-ended 
questions concerning their activities made it obvious that most people, including children, 
                                                 
55 New instruments have recently been developed in KwaZulu-Natal to overcome the problems evident in 
South African LSMS data.  The preliminary results from the Risk and Vulnerability in Employment Survey 
and the Socio-economic Study of the Persistence of Poverty and Inequality are extremely promising; they 
clearly demonstrate the large amount of labour market activity missed in LSM surveys (Lund, 2004; Adato 
et al, 2004: 17). Similarly, the Ministry of Finance in Mozambique has recently completed a large scale 
survey of rural wage labour in three Provinces, using questionnaire instruments and interviewing techniques  
specifically designed to improve upon LSMS employment modules (Sender et al: 2004). 
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had in fact undertaken remunerated activities, but their understanding of the initial 
question, the meaning they attached to ‘remunerated’, and the inability of inexperienced 
interviewers to capture inconsistencies, could have resulted in a very low estimate of the 
number of people who were economically active and an artificially low estimate of the 
employment-to-population ratio. Thus, open-ended questions can play an important role 
in questionnaire design, as can the training and career prospects of enumerators.  The 
problem is that, when implementing the standard modules of large-scale nationally 
representative surveys, researchers have often found it difficult to include context-specific 
open-ended questions, or to ensure enumerator quality56.  LSMS has not managed to 
avoid the problem of unreliable, or even fabricated data arising from inadequate 
monitoring and training of enumerators, as is well-documented in the case of its South 
African surveys (May, 2004: 6). However, it will be difficult to ensure enumerator quality 
and, at the same time, insist on downsizing public sector employment. 
There is also a tension between prioritising nationally representative consumption 
surveys and the need for more reliable data on employment issues. Given the weakness in 
capacity and logistical resources of many African statistical institutions, the donor-
sponsored focus on the calculation of “the national poverty line” often comes at the 
expense of the depth, comprehensiveness and quality of the data relevant for analysing 
the dynamics of poverty.  At least three steps should be taken to enhance the quality of 
information on labour supply: 
 Conventional surveys that aim at statistical representativeness must make greater 
efforts to intensify the training and improve the long-term career structure for a 
professional enumeration staff, to minimise the biases arising from interviewer-
respondent interactions;  
1. All large-scale surveys should be prepared to depart from international 
conventions, recognising that household questionnaires have to be adapted to take 
                                                 
56 For example, in the CWIQ 2000-01 organised in Mozambique, two questions concerning the hiring in 
and out of seasonal labour were included and it was expected that these questions would uncover valuable 
new information about rural labour market dynamics and poverty. However, a simple check of the database 
showed that a high proportion of households claiming to farm large areas of land, of the order of 20 
hectares and more, also claimed they did not hire in any workers. This is not a credible result and illustrates 
the possibility of serious measurement errors when implementing large-scale surveys, using inadequately 
trained enumerators. 
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account of the specific local contexts of labour transactions, as well as the household 
fluidity and variability that is often emphasised in micro-level research; 
2. New types of complementary survey should purposively select samples of 
workers, rather than “households”, focusing on those workers that micro-surveys have 
identified as the most disadvantaged and lowest paid labour market participants.  
The results of a new pro-poor statistical research agenda could fill important data 
gaps and lead to a more realistic discussion of the characteristics of labour markets and 
(self) employment trends, particularly for the most disadvantaged labour force entrants.  
These results are also required to identify policies that are affecting and could increase the 
demand for female and poorly educated labour in the agricultural sector, as well as in the 
services, transport and construction sectors in rural areas. 
6.3  Sectoral Policies for Pro-Poor Investment 
 
The main policy recommendations of this paper are complementary and some 
specific policies serve multiple objectives. This is especially important given the high 
cost of reaching all areas of a country with investments in social and economic 
infrastructure. There is an argument for concentrating policies and expenditures in 
particular areas, to maximise their gains; this in turn may help to generate over time a 
stronger material basis for a future spread of investment to other areas. Section 5 showed 
that the population of Sub-Saharan Africa is highly mobile but that this mobility is 
constrained by financial costs, information barriers and other obstacles (including, in 
some countries at some times, political barriers to movement). What this means in 
practice is that the bulk of population movements typically do not involve the poorest 
Africans. Poorer Africans who do migrate are more likely to move only over short 
distances unless they are mobilised by violence.  
Yet historically and in contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa labour mobility has 
played an important role in improving people’s material existence. For example, wage 
remittances by Mozambicans working on the farms and mines in South Africa and other 
neighbouring countries through much of the twentieth century fuelled a process of 
investment and accumulation within parts of rural Mozambique (Newitt, 1995). In 
Ethiopia, seasonal labour migration to coffee growing areas played a significant role in 
the survival strategies of poor rural northerners from the 1930s onwards, as did migration 
to urban and farming employment opportunities in neighbouring Eritrea and Sudan 
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(McCann, 1987, 192), till political restrictions on population mobility were imposed 
during the 1970s and 1980s. Seasonal labour migration within Ethiopia began to revive in 
the early twenty first century (CDPR, 2004). Thus, a key to the poverty reducing potential 
of rural-rural labour migration by extremely poor labour market participants, both in the 
past and more recently, has been the necessarily uneven pattern of dynamism in 
commercial agriculture.  
Policies that increase the demand for unskilled wage labour on plantations, in 
agribusiness and on dynamic medium-scale farms, combined with policies to reduce the 
costs of migration from areas of concentrated poverty to areas with greater economic 
prospects, may therefore have significant poverty reducing potential. At the heart of these 
policies must be greater efforts to concentrate labour-intensive infrastructure investments, 
focusing on areas where agro-climatic conditions are most favourable for economic 
expansion (and, above all, expansion of export volumes). This policy has the benefit of 
rationalising expenditures in a context of generally high per capita costs for infrastructure 
investment in Africa.  
The poverty reducing impact of concentrating infrastructure investments on areas 
with strong agro-export potential can be maximised by (re)designing fiscal and other 
incentives to encourage production of those crops that demand relatively high levels of 
wage labour inputs. Labour-intensive crops (and female wage labour intensive crops) are 
often precisely those for which there is an export market. Thus, data from Computerised 
Enterprise Budgets (COMBUD) in South Africa, for example, suggest that irrigated crops 
require at least five times more labour on average than non-irrigated crops and that crops 
such as papaya, guava, avocados, tobacco and chillies use between 4,000 and 10,000 
hours of labour per hectare, compared to dry land maize, oats, ryegrass and wheat, which 
according to COMBUD require less than 15 hours per hectare in many areas (Standing et 
al, 1996, 263).  
There are obvious complementarities between this policy focus and other 
priorities, such as the need to manage balance of payments constraints. There are other 
complementarities too. Improvements in transport infrastructure reduce the costs both of 
providing and also of getting access to social infrastructure, including health and 
education facilities and services. In selected rural areas it may then prove relatively cheap 
to maintain and equip primary schools and easier to recruit and retain teachers; it will also 
be easier to provide rural women with antenatal care, treat STDs and provide condoms, to 
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promote public campaigns to reduce violence against girls in schools, to enforce laws 
against domestic violence and to experiment with women-only police posts. If these 
policies – educational, health oriented, export revenue generating, and infrastructural - are 
conceived as integrated priorities, it may then become possible to use improvements in 
transport infrastructure as a means of slowing down HIV transmission rather than 
accelerating it.  
Investments to improve rural infrastructure in the very poorest countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa and a focus on dynamic export-oriented agricultural zones, i.e. areas like 
the coffee and horticulture/floriculture zones of Ethiopia, or the highest potential 
agricultural areas of Mozambique, would have another important benefit. Such a focus 
would make it easier for union officials to generate ‘voice’ among a critical mass of poor 
and often female agricultural workers and for donors to encourage government officials to 
monitor compliance with the international labour standards to which they are signatories.  
 
6.4 Voice and the Bargaining Power of Disadvantaged Labour 
 
The education and health status of the poorest labour market entrants and their 
children is low in absolute terms, but this paper has stressed relative deprivation within 
each country, particularly the scale of the inequalities between poor workers’ access to 
the services that would increase their productivity and that achieved by more privileged 
Africans. It was suggested these inequalities might be explained in political economy 
terms by analysing the balance of political power between different social classes and its 
influence on policy.  The argument was that the bargaining power of the most 
disadvantaged labour market participants was extremely weak and that pro-poor strategies 
should make direct attempts to support the political “voice” or bargaining power of the 
most vulnerable wage workers. 
In many parts of the world and in several African countries, trade unions have 
historically led political struggles for the fundamental rights to which donors have now 
committed themselves, such as democracy and the universal provision of basic education 
and healthcare.  They are potentially important allies in poverty reduction strategies and 
in any attempt to improve labour quality, as well as in efforts to promote realistic research 
on employment and real wage trends.  But their potential has yet to be tapped by donor 
projects and, unfortunately, the donors appear to have missed the opportunity provided by 
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the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) process to strengthen the role of workers 
organizations in policy formulation, implementation and monitoring.   
A review of trade union participation in the PRSP process in 23 countries, 
including 10 Sub-Saharan African countries, concluded that, “no union has reported being 
engaged in the drafting, implementation, or monitoring and evaluation. In a number of 
cases, unions have attended meetings on the PRSP but have not been able to make 
responses due to late delivery of background material, lack of capacity to analyze and 
present alternative proposals or simply because they were invited to only one or two such 
sessions. They have variously classified such a process as ‘cosmetic’, ‘symbolic’ and 
‘unsatisfactory’” (Egulu, 2004: 10).  The same review called for more attention to be paid 
by donors to capacity building programmes to strengthen unions (ibid: 12). 
The need for donors to strengthen their links with the trade union movement and 
with other organizations that represent workers has also recently been stressed by the UK 
Secretary of State for International Development. His Department has made the economic 
case for supporting decent labour standards in poor countries, arguing for the need to 
raise efficiency by ensuring that women are not excluded from labour market 
opportunities, as well as for minimum wage legislation and enforcing the obligation to 
provide decent and safe working conditions, since these standards can reduce wasteful 
labour turnover and facilitate creativity and cooperation in the workplace.  Their 
arguments also make it clear that too few resources are being allocated to improve the 
capacity of African governments to strengthen the performance of their health and safety 
inspectorates.  DFID therefore argues that, “The World Bank could be more active in 
promoting labour rights…” and has supported the case that the International Finance 
Corporation should make adherence to core labour standards a condition for their loans 
(DFID, 2004: 26). 
Trade Unions in Sub-Saharan Africa need external support not merely to increase 
their ability to represent the interests of their existing members, but also to organize, 
mobilize and educate an extremely large pool of poor and casual workers active in the 
unenumerated sector.  Their existing capacity to reach such unorganized workers, 
especially in rural areas, is very limited, although unions in some countries have made 
greater efforts to mobilize new members outside their traditional constituency, as well as 
women, than others (Konings, 2003; Beckman, 2002). The ILO (2004d, 340) has 
recognised this problem. It emphasises the institutional and capacity obstacles to the 
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emergence of effective and accountable representative organisations for workers in 
unenumerated sectors and calls for “voice coalitions” between workers in the informal 
economy and formal workers and their trade unions. This paper supports the 
recommendations by the ILO and DFID for substantial new initiatives to promote the 
organisation of coalitions between wage workers in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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Appendix Tables 
 
 
  
 
Table A1: Recent Data Sources for Analysing the Labour Market 
Country Census 
(last and previous) 
LSMS / CWIQ 
(last and previous) 
Labour force survey 
Mauritania 2000 
1988 
2003 
2000 
 
Senegal 2002 
1988 
2001 
1994 
1991 
Cote d’Ivoire  1998 
1988 
1985-88  
Ghana 2000 
1984 
2002 
1998 
 
Ethiopia 1994 
1984 
2000 
1992 
1999 
Kenya 1999 
1989 
1997 
1994 
 
Uganda 2002 
1991 
1997 
1992 
2003 
Tanzania 2002 
1988 
2000 
1993 
2000 
Zambia 2000 
1990 
2002 
1998 
1999 
Malawi 1998 
1987 
2002 
1998 
 
Mozambique 1997 
1980 
2003 
1997 
Planned in 2004 
South Africa 2001 
1996 
1999 
1995 
2000 
Lesotho 2001 
1996 
2002 
1995 
 
Swaziland 1997 1995 
1985 
 
Sources: WB, UN Population Censuses, national statistical offices 
Note: LSMS=Living Standards Measurement Surveys; CWIQ=Core Welfare Indicators 
Questionnaire 
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Table A2:   Population Distribution by Youth and Adult Age Groups and Estimated Labour Force Growth in 
Selected Regions, (1980, 2000 and 2015) 
 
 Industrialized and Transition 
Economies 
S.E. Asia Sub-Saharan Africa 
Age Group 1980 2000 2015 Labour Force 
Growth 
2003-2015 
1980 2000 2015 Labour Force 
Growth 
2003-2015 
1980 2000 2015 Labour Force 
Growth 
2003-2015 
15-24 Yrs 16.6 13.7 11.6 -3.1% 20.3 19.9 15.9 3.6% 19.0 20.2 20.3 28.2% 
25+ Yrs 61 67.9 71.2 2.6% 39.0 47.7 53.9 25.4% 35.4 35.5 36.1 30.8 
Youth Share in 
Working Age Population 
 
21.4 
 
5.8 
 
14.0 
  
34.2 
 
29.4 
 
23.9 
  
34.9 
 
36.3 
 
36.0 
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                Table A3:  Child labour (Working Children Aged 5 to 14) in Thousands, 
Using Unweighted Regional Averages 
Region 
 
Total 
 
Percent of Cohort 
   
Transition countries 8 310 14.6 
Asia 110 390 18.7 
Latin America 16 466 17.0 
Sub-Saharan Africa 37 902 25.3 
North Africa and Middle East 9 027 10.2 
Total 182 096 18.5 
                         Source: ILO, 2004, p29, table 3.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                Table A4:  Index of Inequality in Grade Four Completion for 15-19 Year 
Old Boys and Girls, by Household Wealth1 
 
Country Boys Girls Gender Gap 
(Boys minus Girls) 
Cote D'Ivoire 0.48 0.67 -0.19 
Ethiopia 0.76 0.90 -0.14 
Ghana 0.21 0.19 0.02 
Kenya 0.03 0.04 -0.01 
Malawi 0.28 0.28 … 
Mozambique 0.64 0.84 -0.19 
Senegal 0.73 0.84 -0.11 
South Africa 0.06 0.04 0.02 
Tanzania 0.21 0.35 -0.14 
Uganda 0.29 0.45 -0.16 
Zambia 0.35 0.32 0.03 
1Educational attainment is measured by the percentage of 15 to 19 year olds in a household that have 
completed four or more years of schooling, among those who have entered school. The inequality index 
ranges from 0, representing complete educational equality between the richest 20 percent and the poorest 
40 percent of households in a given country and a value of 1, indicating a complete lack of educational 
opportunities for the poor.  A score of 0.5 implies that the poorest 20 percent have reached half of the 
levels of educational attainment of the rich. 
    
                        Source: Lloyd and Hewett, 2003: 26 
 
 
 
 
 
 87
 
Table A5:  Initial admissions to the UK nursing register by country 
 
 1998/99 1999/2000 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 
 
Philippines 52 1,052 3,396 7,235 5,593 
India 30 96 289 994 1,830 
South Africa 599 1,460 1,086 2,114 1,368 
Australia 1,335 1,209 1,046 1,342 920 
Nigeria 179 208 347 432 509 
Zimbabwe 52 221 382 473 485 
New Zealand 527 461 393 443 282 
Ghana 40 74 140 195 251 
Kenya 19 29 50 155 152 
Zambia 15 40 88 183 133 
Malawi 1 15 45 75 57 
Botswana 4 - 87 100 39 
Total incl.others 3,621 5,945 8,403 15,064 12,730 
Note: The decline in figures in 2003 does not indicate a break in the trend but reflects the backlog in 
processing of registration that accumulated towards the end of the year. 
 
Source: Nursing and Midwifery Council, Statistical Analysis of the Register, www.nmc-uk.org  
 
 
 
Table A6:  Workers’ remittances received by country ($bn) 
 
          1995          1999 
Lesotho 0.4 0.3 
Nigeria 0.8 1.3 
Senegal 0.1 0.2 
Sudan 0.3 0.7 
Sub-Saharan Africa 2.7 3.5 
East Asia & Pacific 8.3 10.6 
Latin America & Caribbean 12.8 16.9 
Middle East & North Africa 8.6 10.5 
South Asia 10.0 15.1 
Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance 2003, World Bank 
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Table A7:  Refugee population by UNHCR Bureau, 2003 
 
UNHCR Bureau    Begin 2003      End 2003 Annual change (%) 
Central Africa & Great Lakes 1,301,700 1,257,900 -3.4 
East & Horn of Africa 937,600 768,100 -18.1 
Southern Africa 321,200 306,200 -4.7 
West Africa 528,000 531,200 0.6 
Total Africa* 3,088,500 2,663,400 -7.3 
 
* excluding North Africa 
Source: UNHCR (2004), Refugees by Numbers, 2004 Edition, Geneva: UNHCR 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A8:  Road network and incidence of paved roads, 1970s 
 
 Density of road network
(km/km2) 
Percentage of paved roads 
Botswana 0.02 9.5 
Burkina Faso 0.06 5.1 
Congo 0.02 6.5 
Ethiopia 0.03 28.0 
Kenya 0.09 9.7 
Malawi 0.05 12.2 
Mali 0.01 11.1 
Nigeria 0.11 40.2 
Senegal 0.07 23.0 
Tanzania 0.02 35.0 
Zaire 0.06 1.5 
Zambia 0.05 13.0 
   
Bangladesh 0.35 32.0 
India 0.41 38.8 
Indonesia 0.41 37.2 
Source: Platteau, 1996. 
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                            Table A9: Infrastructure Provision in Sample Countries 
Country Name 1999 2000 2001 
 
Cote d'Ivoire    
Fixed line and mobile phone subscribers (per 1,000 
people) 32.8 49.82 62.52 
Personal computers (per 1,000 people) 5.51 6.09 7.2 
Roads, paved (% of total roads) 9.7 .. .. 
    
Ethiopia    
Electric power consumption (kwh per capita) 21.42 22.07 21.83 
Fixed line and mobile phone subscribers (per 1,000 
people) 3.29 3.93 4.76 
Personal computers (per 1,000 people) 0.74 0.95 1.15 
Roads, paved (% of total roads) 13.3 12 .. 
    
Ghana    
Electric power consumption (kwh per capita) 252.78 320.17 350.14 
Fixed line and mobile phone subscribers (per 1,000 
people) 11.62 18.17 20.83 
Personal computers (per 1,000 people) 2.54 2.97 3.34 
Roads, paved (% of total roads) 29.6 .. 18.4 
    
Kenya    
Electric power consumption (kwh per capita) 118.03 105.94 116.77 
Fixed line and mobile phone subscribers (per 1,000 
people) 11.45 14.64 29.6 
Personal computers (per 1,000 people) 4.36 4.89 5.59 
Roads, paved (% of total roads) 12.1 12.1 .. 
    
Lesotho    
Fixed line and mobile phone subscribers (per 1,000 
people) 15.94 20.34 36.29 
Roads, paved (% of total roads) 18.3 .. .. 
    
Malawi    
Fixed line and mobile phone subscribers (per 1,000 
people) 6.3 9.1 10.58 
Personal computers (per 1,000 people) 0.99 1.16 1.25 
Roads, paved (% of total roads) 18.5 .. .. 
    
Mauritania    
Fixed line and mobile phone subscribers (per 1,000 
people) 6.66 13.45 51.76 
Personal computers (per 1,000 people) 8.06 9.81 10.33 
Roads, paved (% of total roads) 11.3 .. .. 
    
Mozambique    
Electric power consumption (kwh per capita) 59.54 57.26 266.06 
Fixed line and mobile phone subscribers (per 1,000 
people) 5.46 8 13.71 
Personal computers (per 1,000 people) 3.02 3.51 3.96 
Roads, paved (% of total roads) 18.7 .. .. 
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    Table A9: Infrastructure Provision in Sample Countries (cont’d.) 
Country Name 1999 2000 2001 
 
Senegal    
Electric power consumption (kwh per capita) 114.46 120.57 129.71 
Fixed line and mobile phone subscribers (per 1,000 
people) 27.35 47.89 54.98 
Personal computers (per 1,000 people) 15.09 16.8 18.36 
Roads, paved (% of total roads) 29.3 29.3 .. 
    
South Africa    
Electric power consumption (kwh per capita) 3703.68 3643.14 3792.71 
Fixed line and mobile phone subscribers (per 1,000 
people) 248.08 304.46 352.63 
Personal computers (per 1,000 people) 60.39 66.38 69.57 
Roads, paved (% of total roads) 20.3 20.3 .. 
    
Swaziland    
Fixed line and mobile phone subscribers (per 1,000 
people) 46.25 64.68 85.29 
Personal computers (per 1,000 people) .. 11.9 15.69 
Roads, paved (% of total roads) .. .. .. 
    
Tanzania    
Electric power consumption (kwh per capita) 54.95 56.77 58.49 
Fixed line and mobile phone subscribers (per 1,000 
people) 6.32 10.84 17.13 
Personal computers (per 1,000 people) 2.52 3.06 3.57 
Roads, paved (% of total roads) 4.2 .. .. 
    
Uganda    
Fixed line and mobile phone subscribers (per 1,000 
people) 5.12 10.88 13.94 
Personal computers (per 1,000 people) 2.48 2.61 2.94 
Roads, paved (% of total roads) 6.7 .. .. 
    
Zambia    
Electric power consumption (kwh per capita) 585.67 567.77 584.59 
Fixed line and mobile phone subscribers (per 1,000 
people) 11.13 17.71 19.55 
Personal computers (per 1,000 people) 6.5 6.81 7.09 
Roads, paved (% of total roads) .. 62.3 22 
Source: World Bank (2004). 
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Table A10:  Radio and television receivers in 1997 
Number of radio 
broadcasting receivers 
Number of television 
receivers 
Region 
Total 
(millions) 
per 1,000 
inhabitants 
Total 
(millions) 
per 1,000 
inhabitants 
Developing countries of which: 1 124 245 720 157 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
121 202 29 48 
Arab States 
 
71 269 31 119 
Latin America and the Caribbean 204 412 101 205 
Eastern Asia and Oceania 558 306 461 253 
Southern Asia 
 
160 118 73 54 
Least developed countries 85 142 14 23 
Developed countries 
 
1 308 1 061 675 548 
Source: UNESCO (2004). 
 
 
 
Table A11:  Labour Force Surveys in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Country Year Survey Name 
Angola  1992 Inquerito sobre emprego e desemprego na cidade de Luanda  
Ethiopia  1999 National Labour Force Survey 1999  
Gabon  1994 Enquête Emploi Chômage  
Madagascar  1996 Enquête emploi  
Mali  1997 Enquête sur l'Emploi et le Chômage au Mali  
Nigeria  1984 Labor Force Survey 1984  
Rwanda  1988 Enquête nationale sur l'emploi 1988  
Senegal  1991 Enquête emploi, sous emploi, chômage en milieu urbain 1991, 
région de Dakar  
Tanzania  2000 Integrated Labor force survey  
Zambia  1999 Child Labor Survey and End of Decade Survey 1999  
Source: Africa Poverty Monitoring database, World Bank 
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Table A12:  Differences in Unemployment Rates by Region 
 Unemployment Rate (%) 
 
 1993 2002 2003 
Eastern Africa 10.3 10.9 11.0 
Central Africa 12.8 9.3 9.4 
Southern Africa 27.1 30.1 31.6 
Western Africa 7.1 6.8 6.7 
Source: ILO 2004e, extracted from Table 6.1  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                   Table A13: Differences in ILO Data Sources and Definitions Covering   
the Economically Active Population 
  Age limit Years (between 1980 and latest) Main source 
Cote d’Ivoire 6+ 1988 PC 
Ethiopia 10+ 1980, 1984, 1988, 1991-95, 1999 OE, PC 
Ghana 7+ 2000 PC 
Kenya 10+ 1989 PC 
Lesotho n.a. n.a.  
Malawi 10-64 1983, 1988, 1998 PC and LFS 
Mauritania 6+ 1988 PC 
Mozambique 12+ 1980 PC 
Senegal 6+ 1983-85, 1988, 1995 OE and PC 
South Africa 15+ 1980, 1985, 1991, 2003 PC and LFS 
Swaziland 12+ 1986 PC 
Tanzania 10+ 2001 LFS 
Uganda n.a. n.a.  
Zambia 15+ 1980, 1981, 1984 OE,  PC 
Source: LABORSTA, ILO.   
Note: PC = Population Census; OE = Official Estimate; LFS = Labour Force Survey. 
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